

The master restationing plan was well developed as a concept. We were nearing the end of the relocation of the three headquarters in Campbell Barracks. That was well on the way and most of the arguments had gone by the wayside. So, I had a good feeling of satisfaction, but it had been a long, tiring year.

Also, I really enjoyed my two years in command of the 7th Engineer Brigade. That was just a top-drawer assignment, working with super people. I really liked General Ott and interacting with the division commanders and assistant division commanders and all the colonels and others that over the years I interacted with more and more. I mean, Colonel Butch [Crosbie E.] Saint, later CINCUSAREUR, was commander of the 11th Armored Cav, then on the USAREUR staff at that time. Major General Bob Dacey was on the USAREUR staff as a colonel. Walt Kastenmayer, in DCSLOG, was later to make brigadier. When I first arrived, the Chief of Staff, 3d Mech Division, was Colonel Jack Galvin [later the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe]; Bob Elton was the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff; and Glenn Otis [later the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe] came over at that time as a major general to command the 1st Armored Division. Lieutenant Colonel Ed Leland was G-3, 3d Mech Division, and is a three star at EUCOM now. You just go on and on of people who we were involved with. Of course, I worked for Major General Vald Heiberg and Major General Dick Groves, people that I came back and worked with and for later on. It was a superb experience and I really enjoyed it.

My family really enjoyed Europe. I still managed to get away for a skiing vacation here or there and to take advantage of space A travel and the Air Force's C-130s to England and Spain during those three years. So, it was a very enjoyable experience. I've always enjoyed assignment to Europe, and that certainly was a measure of why I sought the assignment leaving Fort Belvoir later to go back as the DCSENGR.

Deputy Assistant Chief of Engineers

Q: You mentioned about finding out about your next assignment while you were still in Europe, and I wondered if you could reflect a little bit on your selection for the Deputy ACE job and the factors that you see in getting the assignment.

A: With every assignment there's some negotiations with the assignment officer. By the time you reach colonel, many people get involved and the assignment officer's working with various folks. I don't quite know how it happened or what came first, really. As I mentioned, it was such an intense year, and years are very short in terms of assignments. I reported to the job in DCSENGR, Europe, in the summer of '78 and knew already in January, February of '79 that they were putting together the slate for the coming year of assignments. So, I'd only been there five or six months and already somebody's thinking about where I was going to be reassigned. I knew I was coming back to the States and was not going to stay in Europe another year.

I really don't recall how it happened, but it was rather a natural progression because, having been the Chief of Installations and Construction in Europe, dealing with Military Programs and all of the major activities going on, all the trips I was making back to the Army Staff to brief them on various activities for which the ACE is one of the major players, the fact that I could go in and be the Deputy ACE was a very natural progression.

So, now whether Major General Bill Read asked for me, Major General Vald Heiberg volunteered me sometime when they were talking, or what, I don't know. I don't know which one of them mentioned it to me first, but I had known I wanted to come back to the Washington area.

We owned a house in northern Virginia and I knew that's where I wanted to serve, in the Pentagon somewhere or in USACE. It seemed to be the natural step, that I certainly had something to offer Major General Bill Read, the ACE and our point man for a lot of things on the Army Staff. He would be able to get somebody who was involved in some of the high-visibility things, like rapid reinforcement of NATO, the master restationing plan, a lot of the initiatives that I talked about before, and that Lieutenant General Groves was pushing now that he was back in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Those initiatives were going to the Hill and the committees were talking about things, and General Bill Read, as the ACE, was the testifier for those committees. So, I would certainly bring some on-the-ground, hands-on experience with many high-visibility initiatives plus knowledge of the regular programming responsibility for construction and the construction program in Europe.

So, I really don't know who mentioned it to me first or how. It just all happened because it was natural. It might have been the assignment officer; it might have been Bill Read; it might have been Vald Heiberg.

Q: You hadn't worked with Read before, had you?

A: No, I never had. I had first met him when, as a colonel assignment officer, I made that very first briefing for General Clarke on OPMS, and he had asked me to brief a couple of the new brigadiers that were in town. One of them was Jim Kelly, another one was Bill Read. So, I met him there, and I hadn't seen him, really, since my year in the Office of the DCSENGR. Each time we'd come back, we'd go in and brief the ACE.

Q: I have an organization chart. Maybe a good place to start would be to talk about exactly what you did as Deputy ACE, the various things that you got involved in. I have some specifics to bring out. One of the things—well, one of the things would be your role with testifying on the Military Construction, Army, program.

A: Okay. Well, let me just first say that I started off very rapid fire because I reported in on the date that Bill Read had said would be acceptable, and when I reported in he said, "Well, I'm going on leave to Europe for 30 days, starting tomorrow." So, that's how I started—being the acting ACE for a month. That certainly does accelerate your learning curve because you're now the principal at all the meetings. Let me just talk about my duties, and I'll start off with

the one mentioned. There really was not much involvement for me in testifying before the committees as the Deputy ACE.

Now, having made that statement, I think I went over only once or twice to appear before a committee and testify. The reason for that is that the ACE job is a rather high-intensity job because you're always in the middle of the PPBES [planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system] process. The ACE is always preparing, contributing to defense guidance, working the POM, or working the budget. There are just an intense number of meetings to go to as you're wrestling with new budgets or the cuts. A new cut comes down, new bogies need to be met, and the ACE, as part of the Army Staff, meets with others as they sort all those out. There are regular procedures for all of this that I should get to.

In the meantime, the ACE has four committees that he's the principal Army officer for testifying before—the Appropriations and the Military Construction Subcommittees of both the House and Senate. The ACE has more testifying days than any other officer on the Army Staff. Bill Read described my job responsibilities—he would basically take the testimony to the Congress side of the ACE house, and he would leave me to work the programming and budgeting issues on the Army Staff.

I don't know if that's a "Mr. Inside/Mr. Outside" because you're not traveling far when you just go over the river to the Hill. He described the problem he faced in his first year as ACE, that he found himself coming and going daily. He would be returning from the Hill, having testified, and someone would push papers at him so that he could attend a Program Budget Committee meeting for which he'd have to be voting on Army Staff issues. That meeting would be over at 6:30 or 7:00 p.m., and then he would have to go back to a prep session then and again early the next morning before going back to the Hill at 10:00 a.m. or so to testify to another committee. He said, "You can't prepare and go to Hill meetings and prepare and go to Army Staff meetings while they're all going on concurrently." So, he was going to take the former, I was going to take the latter, and that's how he divided things up, basically.

He would attend Select Committee meetings, often with General Morris, the Chief of Engineers, when our issues got to that level, and he'd carry the ball. I carried the prep in those sessions and was the principal ACE member at the Program Budget Committee. Now, the way it works on the Department of the Army Staff is that the Program Budget Committee is a committee co-chaired by the Director of Programming Analysis and Evaluation and the Director of the Army Budget. I say co-chaired because they'd each take the lead depending on whether it was a programming session or a budgeting session. If you were addressing the program, then the Director of Programming would take the lead, and that was Major General Max Thurman and then Major General Pat Roddy that year. If it was a budgeting session then it was chaired by the Director of the Budget, and that was an engineer general, later Comptroller of the Army, Major General Peixotto.

The voting members were the Army Staff proponents' budget persons. I certainly get to meet a lot of good people up there when we're wrestling with all those issues. Everybody brings their agencies' agenda to the table. I'd sit next to Larry Skibbie, who then was a brigadier working in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development. He later

became a deputy commander of AMC. Brigadier General Herb Temple, later a National Guard Bureau Chief, was the National Guard Bureau's action person, and so forth.

We would meet to try to put together the Army's position on the program or the budget. From there, the two principals would take the results to the Select Committee, which was co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff and the Under Secretary of the Army and consisted of all the Army Staff principals. That would be the final wrestling area before the program or budget was presented to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army. So, we tried to wrestle with all the issues at the brigadier/two-star level to come up with recommendations to the Select Committee. We tried to get it—POM or budget—focused and molded into some sort of shape, ready for the committee. We would highlight issues that couldn't be resolved at our level, which would then be presented to the committee for their action.

That year, '79 to '80, I typically was our rep on the Program Budget Committee, and then at Select Committee time I often would go with the Chief, General Morris, as the back-up person, or General Read attended for General Morris and I'd go as the back-up person, or sometimes General Read went as the back-up person to General Morris. That's how we covered the committee.

Then, as you asked what did I do, what was my job during the year—it was principally focused around putting the program together and putting all those kinds of initiatives together, doing the Program Budget Committee actions and related things. It also broadened out as Bill Read's deputy to cover other activities that went on in the ACE's shop across the board. General Read left most of the military engineering items to me. I'd been a commander in Europe, more recently in touch with things than he was, and so he left that to me. We both were involved in the Environmental Office headed by Colonel Charlie Sell. That was really coming into its own at that time. Lot of things were happening, so we worked that, whoever was there.

In the Installations Planning Division, both of us worked that, although the master restationing plan that I'd worked on in Europe was now big in the ACE's shop because General Groves was trying to get the Army to push it up to defense and was really active on it. Since I brought that experience with me, I worked the master restationing plan issues.

In addition, emergency planning was starting to get a big play on the Army Staff toward the end of that year. Al Carton had Programming Division and, of course, he was so well-experienced and had that all on-line. He was dealing with the congressional committees and dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I would often be a participant in our internal preparations for testimony, putting it together, but he and General Read really did the prep sessions. I didn't get involved in the hours going over the testimony books. I'd be tracking along so I could be a filler, if necessary.

One time I did get involved in testifying was toward the end of the year when General Read was out of town. We had to testify before the House Appropriations Subcommittee pertaining to cost overruns, in particular the Army's project, the new Walter Reed Hospital.

The question was, “Why did it cost \$10 million more than had initially been estimated?” I was designated to go over and testify about that.

Q: That’s a really hot-seat position, I think, to testify on overruns.

A: Well, yes. I hadn’t even taken my seat when the committee chairman said, “Well, General, what are we going to do about an Army that has a \$10 million cost overrun.” It was my first time before a committee. I was trying to put my thoughts together. I mean, I was still walking from my back seat to the table. Somebody else in the Air Force had been up and now they were leaving, and here we are approaching and the chairman was already asking a question. I didn’t have my books out or anything, I’m just moving forward and trying to key my mind too. So, I just blurted out what came to mind, which was, “I don’t know, Sir, but just remember it’s the only Army we’ve got.” [Laughter] It seemed to keep the day going. I won’t say it carried the day because there were a lot of questions that followed—but at least I didn’t get thrown out.

Q: Let’s talk a minute, maybe, about the organization of the office and how it functioned. Before we started actually taping, we were talking about the executive assistant position, I guess it’s called now, and the lack of it at that time. That’s one issue that you might want to address. Let’s start with that, and I have a couple of others to follow.



Ann Kem and Lieutenant General John W. Morris (right), Chief of Engineers, pin brigadier general’s stars on General Kem’s uniform during his promotion ceremony in November 1979.



General Kem's wife, children, and parents at his promotion to brigadier general in November 1979. From left to right, John S. Kem, Ann Kem, Steven E. Kem, General Kem, Mrs. Charles E. (Janice) Kem, Dr. Charles E. Kem, and Michelle Kem.

A: Well, the Deputy ACE was a colonel's position. The fact was that the ACE really needed two general officers to do the kind of high-level things that I've just described and to be on a par with other deputy chiefs up there who all had four or five generals. They could always be covered at a meeting by a general; the ACE was always short. I came in as a colonel and that's what I was expected to be. I brought the experience with me, but as luck would have it, about a month after I arrived I was on the brigadiers list. I was toward the top of the list, so I was promoted the first part of November. Therefore, we now had two general officers, and so we just had more clout. I mean, the way the Army Staff works is you sit by date of rank around the table. The more rank you have, the closer to the front of the table where the action is. When you have a table with 12 generals at it, and the colonels fill the end of the table or the back rows, then it's nice to have two generals there to do the job.

We had a major as the executive officer for the office. The DCSOPS and DCSLOG were much bigger and had colonel executive directors. They each had a deputy director who was a two-star and then they'd have several other major general directorate heads. So, we were really undergunned by only having a major. A major could run the office. He could be a senior admin type, but not an executive officer in the sense of the way the Pentagon runs.

That's somebody that the Director of the Army Staff could call down to, a colonel-level person, and work the whole organization. You didn't have to have the generals present in those other places—their executive officer fielded the ball and pulled in whichever director was responsible. Whereas, with a major, typically you're going to get a good professional and the best kind of person, but he can't be directing a bunch of higher level people. So, we were short in that regard. That's been corrected over the years now that the ACE has a colonel.

Q: Was there any effort at that time to push for a change, or did that not really come up?

A: Well, I was clamoring for it. I think General Read was just happy that he now had a second general and things were happening to keep him happy. You should recognize one other thing. At that time, Military Programs was a directorate within USACE. General Wray headed that, and General Read was listed as Deputy Director for Requirements and Programs as the ACE. General Sisinyak was Deputy Director for Facilities Engineering—the old separate Directorate of Facilities Engineering had been placed under Military Programs to provide a stem-to-stern Army facilities directorate. Military Programs Directorate would take facilities from original concept, installation planning in the ACE's shop, through programming and budgeting for the construction, then construction, and then over to facilities engineering and housing. The Military Programs Directorate would do the construction through its military construction districts. Thus, General Wray had two deputies, but he was not the rater of the ACE. The ACE was rated by the Chief of Engineers directly. Whereas General Sisinyak was with Military Programs in Headquarters, USACE, of course the ACE was in the Pentagon.

I don't know how I got on to that, but I was trying to make a point.

Q: Well, the interaction between the ACE and Military Programs.

A: Yes, you have to keep that in mind to understand then how the ACE operated because the ACE was, and I was, as mentioned, the person who went to the Program Budget Committee and brought the programs together. Yet, the people who did the facility engineering and the housing components of the program worked over in the Forrestal Building. So, we would have to pull them over to meet with us so we could put all the numbers together. We weren't doing that too well back at that time. We worked a lot that year to try to make that program wrap up better.

Later organizational changes sought to bring those facilities components and housing components to the ACE so we would have a better tie. There were some thoughts of moving them. Later, there was a facilities programmer and a housing programmer added to Al Carton's Programming Division shop, trying to make the ACE more effective in the programming business.

Anyway, I was the deputy. After me and the changes, Jerry Hilmes had come in to replace Sisinyak, who had replaced John Wall. After I left the ACE, it was decided to take the brigadier general facility engineer position out of Military Programs and bring it over to be the Deputy ACE. This formalized the position—I was there in a colonel position but a serving brigadier—to give it the clout of the two generals. Brigadier General Jerry Hilmes

moved over in that position, so you had the two general officers in the ACE's shop. Then Major General Norm Delbridge, when he was ACE, brought Al Carton up to be a second deputy, so there were two deputy ACEs. Then the Army did the normal kind of expected thing when they ever find two deputies: they cut one out, and the easy one to cut was the general officer. So, the Department of the Army took away that second general position, leaving, then, just the major general ACE and the civilian deputy. So, that's how that migration happened, and somewhere in there is when the executive officer became an executive director and a colonel.

Q: So, now at this point that we're looking at, when you were the Deputy ACE, the Programming Division and the Installations Planning Division have the dotted line in the ACE organization because they're actually in Military Programs, right?

A: That's right because the Corps wanted to represent Military Programs as a stem-to-stern organization. Read across the divisions of the Military Program Directorate—installations planning, programming, engineering, construction, operations, and maintenance—you recognize the life cycle, leaving out real estate acquisition and disposition, in the Real Estate Directorate. General Read then was listed as a deputy, double starred. Then on the ACE chart the solid lines are to Military Engineering and the Environmental Office, under the ACE alone and not part of Military Programs. The ACE had staff supervision over those two.

In reality, we operated as two separate organizations. We did participate in, and I often attended—but not General Read—the Military Programs staff meeting that General Wray would hold to keep the continuity of information flowing back and forth between the two.

Q: That is a sort of complicated link-up there, isn't it? In 1979, I believe, the Corps became a MACOM, recognized as a major Army command. So, distinguishing the Chief of Engineers' Army Staff responsibilities, which the ACE carries out, the MACOM responsibilities, which come under the new MACOM, made a complex mixing of responsibilities there, didn't it? Was it difficult for the people involved to sort these things out, or is this something that is more complex from the outside than it is from the inside?

A: No, it's only complex if you try to believe that it operated like the line diagrams. I mean, the dotted lines versus the solid lines on here really reflect who ran things. The dotted lines really ran those shops that are dotted, not the solid. What's even more confusing—you have Brigadier General Mark Sisinyak then as Deputy Director for Facilities Engineering. That was not, you see, principally a MACOM function. It was principally an Army Staff function.

Yet, he was the deputy that stayed over in Military Programs and the Army Housing Management Office stayed over there and worked for the Military Programs, and all the programmers, so we really hadn't separated out O&M [Operations and Maintenance] from Construction Engineering.

In reality, General Wray never came over to the ACE's shop—he concentrated on Military Programs. Don't read that absolutely; what I mean to say is that he'd come over often to sit in for the Chief of Engineers in the Select Committee and we'd pre-brief him and all the rest,

but we didn't routinely have him because he left it to General Read to run the installation planning and the program budgeting functions and to testify on the Hill.

Of course, he had been the ACE before Major General Read. When one has such a seat-of-the-pants feel for something—he and General Read could talk on the phone, and he would understand immediately where things were and how things were running. So, he didn't pay attention to the nitty-gritty or hold the meetings to develop things involving installation planning and the programming aspects. At the same time, General Read really didn't get involved with running the MACOM aspects of the Corps—that is, design and construction or the facility engineering execution—even though we did the programming.

It was difficult for me to get the facilities and housing program people over. I could go right outside my office and there were the construction programmers. When we had four hours to prepare for a change or present something to the Program Budget Committee the next day that we'd just found out about, I'd have to get on the phone and call over. Hopefully, we'd find out before five o'clock because people bailed out of the Forrestal Building with their carpools and the people I needed might already be on their way home. It was difficult not having all programmers in the ACE.

General Read had John Sheehey, who worked between the two offices. He was the one who was always filling in the data and the projects and maintaining the books that Al Carton used for programming and which engineering and construction were going to design and build to—the designers, most specifically.

Thus, Generals Wray and Read ran two separate organizations and both were fully employed, I can assure you, with the many things happening in the Army. The next organization change brought facilities engineering and Jerry Hilmes over to be under the ACE. Now the Army Staff included both installation planning and programming and the installation support of facility engineers under one head. Then the USACE execution part, design and construction, were under another head.

We were living through a point of transition when I was there; that is, we were understanding what next needed to be fixed, and at the time of the next change, they were fixed.

Q: When I talked to you on your assignment when you were a Deputy Chief of Engineers, you referred to the situation as one in which there were tensions between Military Programs and the ACE. You didn't really use that word today, but I mean, was it causing real problems in the operations that that word might indicate?

A: We had some tensions involved really with what I've already subtly described as trying to get the programming folks together, trying to get the people back when they've gone home at 5:00 and you have the pressure of a meeting the next morning at 7:30 and you have no one to work the facility engineering programming issue or the housing programming issue, and somebody to build the case. On the one hand, Al Carton, who'd been there so long, and his organization was right down the hall, and when somebody said, "You've got to cut \$40 million out of MCA," they would fall in, do some what-ifs, get on the phone and call

commands, and would put together the ACE's position. I mean, we just couldn't call all these shots without touching base with others. Some of them required other people to be coordinated with and to contribute. Al's team was there to work that.

The same call would say, "We need the Chief of Engineers' recommendation on where to take a \$60 million cut out of facilities operations and maintenance—O&M money." We'd have to get on the phone, call over to the Military Programs shop, and there were no vice presidents in charge of facilities other than the executive director. We'd be working directly with individual action officer programmers. We'd have to almost barter for their time, depending on the other agenda items they might have gotten from their direct bosses. So, in a sense, it may have been a matrix organization in which we had not defined well our horizontal matrix line. We spent the year trying to better define that. I mean, General Wray was very cooperative in dealing with it. It's just that with the rapid-fire turnaround of things and the intensity on the Army Staff when you're in those budget and program cycles, the calendar dictates on certain days that you do various things. If somebody has another new idea, he'd have to wedge it in the same time frame.

One thing I hadn't mentioned before is that typically I would go into a Program Budget Committee meeting and it'd be chaos. They'd line up a priority of things in a program and draw the line about the number to be funded, and everybody's pet project or program would be sitting in the unfunded area. So, they'd all—and me, too—would insist that one had to be funded. We'd stuff it back in the program and then others would bubble out, as the expression goes. Then you'd have to stuff those back in. After three hours of this in that hot, humid room, sitting all cramped in, everybody's tempers get a little tight and you're not winning. Then the chairs would say, "Well, let's run another printout and let the council of colonels deal with this one."

Well, I mean, that was really a no deal for the council of colonels. I mean, what that meant was they'd have to take—now 6:30 at night—another couple, three hours to run the computer printout and then they'd meet at 9:00 that night and do some more wrestling with the issues, trying to come up with something. Their tempers were probably frayed, too, because they'd been sitting in listening to all this other stuff in the afternoon. Then they would try to work out some sort of agreements that could be presented the next morning at 9:00 to the same Program Budget Committee. So, they would stay up half the night and they'd run another computer printout in the morning. They would all meet with their general officer principals and convince them that the solution was the right kind of solution, that they shouldn't argue so hard at the Program Budget Committee meeting, or they should, or we're still getting screwed on this one so we better go in and make the case, or try to make a couple of phone calls to get some other support before going back to meet again.

Well, when you've got that kind of intensity and all of a sudden you need some fact in the facilities side and it's after 5:00 and the council of colonels is going to meet in two hours, and you're dealing with Europe, Korea, in other time zones—nothing meshes. It's not like putting together, say, a research and development program. That's very complex too, though, as I found out later at Fort Belvoir. You've got to deal with a lot of people there, but at least

most of them are in the continental United States. So, we in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Engineers were really at a disadvantage.

So, the tensions I was talking about largely came from a running tempo—like we just weren't getting supported with timely responsiveness and facts and prep. By "prep" I mean developing the chart that articulates what we want to say that will win the argument with the Program Budget Committee—without my having to do it. We just didn't have that process greased. We hadn't operated this way before with two generals, one doing the Hill and one being able to concentrate on the Program Budget Committee. I had some time now to concentrate and try to get this one right—because before we just tried to ad hoc it and get the best we could. That's what I meant by the tensions.

There might have been some others, which is almost a perennial thing on trading information—whether a project's going to make 35 percent design by a certain date because they had to deliver that or adversely affect the program—before congressional testimony. There were no tensions between Read and Wray. It was really—I think as I mentioned, just the fact that we were transitioning. We were trying to be a more responsive, a bigger hitter on the Army Staff.

Now, the ACE was always a big hitter in the program arena, but these many initiatives that have been happening in Europe that I described before which came out of the administration, the master restationing plan in Europe, more construction in Europe, the ammo program, the rapid reinforcement of NATO program, plus Korea construction, all these kinds of things were initiatives and the ACE was to be the facilities player for these things. If you want to be a player, you have to go to the meetings. The meetings take a lot of time and you're there for a long time. So, I think we were a little more austere in the ACE's shop than the fellow deputies of operations, log, personnel, and the rest. They were really burgeoning bureaucracies in comparison to the austerity found in Al Carton's Programming Office and our tiny Environmental Office. We were at the point where, you know, a couple of absences because of sickness or vacation could really leave us in a void.

So, we were building and the tensions came. Bill Read brought me in to up-gun our contribution to these Army programs, I believe, raise the level of contribution and participation. To do that required staff work so that we could input and have the homework complete. Those were the kinds of catalysts that contributed to the reorganization that occurred one or two years later.

Q: What about testifying before Congress? Would the Military Programs Office have responsibility for the committees dealing with issues of O&M and housing, for example? The question is, is there a problem in the relationship with congressional committees related to the Corps' organization?

A: I don't think so. I believe General Read did the testimony on all those aspects. They, of course, contributed design status and those kinds of things. Well, for example, I was the one testifying on the cost overruns at Walter Reed rather than the Director of Military Programs. General Read was the Deputy Director of Military Programs, so he was the person to testify,

whether he testified as the ACE or for General Wray on the execution side. It works on the basis that you need to build up any kind of relationship with congressmen and their staffs—and there were an awful lot of meetings, you know, where General Read would go over one-on-one with staffers and talk with them about things or call on a congressman to work things out in addition to testifying. General Read had working relationships with the staffers and the committee chairmen, so he was the right person to carry over the cards.

Q: What about—this is a little different issue—within the secretariat? What about relations, for example, with the Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics at that point? You know, in the interim it has been an issue, and so what was it like at the time you were there?

A: I guess Paul Johnson must have been there.

Q: Okay.

A: Same crew. They were there and we interacted with them; I don't sense with quite the same degree of specificity that goes on now. Perhaps I'm wrong. Perhaps I just wasn't involved with that, and perhaps General Read, in carrying something to the Hill, touched all those bases. Later, when I was in Europe as DCSENGR, I knew many things that the ACE was telling me that he had to get secretariat approval on this. I had the feeling that we went to the secretary a lot more than we used to—maybe we always did.

Certainly the environment wasn't a big issue thing then, and Dee Walker's position didn't exist, so when that came about there was a whole new arena for contact between the two offices.

Q: Okay. One of the things that, in talking with General Hatch—I've been interviewing him over the last year—we talked about the level of participation, direct participation by the Chief on the Select Committee. You referred earlier to, I think, the ACE at times attending that meeting. General Hatch was making a point, which was something that General Heiberg also observed when he was Chief about the importance of the Chief actually attending those meetings.

Do you have any comments on that from your period of time? Did it seem like it was fairly routine for the Chief not to attend, or what? I had a sense that General Heiberg had identified this as something that he wished he had done more of. He thought it was a more important thing to have happened and it didn't.

A: Yes. I think General Hatch has done extremely well in carving out the time to make sure he's present there when the Army's senior leadership gets together, either the General Policy Group or Select Committee. When the Army wants to get its collective leadership together to advise the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army, it's an important time. I think that it is an important time for the Chief of Engineers to be present so that he's seen as a contributing member of the Army and not just "that civil works guy." Hank Hatch has done it very well. Others may have too, but I had more visibility of how Hank Hatch did it.

With his predecessors, I think oftentimes their schedule called them away to do other things. I almost put them back to a parallel experience as when we discussed my being the community commander in Germany as well as the brigade commander. I think I suggested at the time the community could always schedule something earlier than the troop command side. So, if I let the schedule just happen and be filled up by the one who asked first, the community would fill the schedule and I wouldn't have any quality time to command the brigade or go to Corps meetings. So, I learned that I had to be in charge of my schedule. Not that I'd take over from the secretary, but I couldn't accept everything that somebody wanted to put on my schedule. I had to save important times and things, give tentative okays but not finals. I would caveat things—I may have to send a rep, and that sort of thing. Otherwise, I would have been totally consumed by community activities and never have had time to do the troop side.

I think the same thing happens to the Chief of Engineers. He really needs to be there when the Army's senior leadership is getting together over things. Yet, you don't always know when that will be. The Chief can certainly fill up his schedule with visits to the Far East, going along to the good old Missouri River Division, paying a semiannual visit to the Southwest Division, dropping into the Lower Mississippi Valley—the good folks in the Delta are always happy to see you down there. Those are pretty easy to accept, and the Chief can really fill up the schedule before important things are scheduled.

Q: Same?

A: That's right. The Chief has to weigh his time. The Army Staff's PPBES calendar is all laid out at the start of the year, so it is known generally when the senior leadership's going to be getting together for purposes of deciding their response to defense guidance, or final approval of the POM, or sending the budget out. I think the Chief can ensure that certain areas of time are left open for that. He would be there at those key kinds of events. They schedule four-star conferences well in advance, so he can always be involved in that, and I think most Chiefs made themselves available, but not always.

So, from my experience back in those days, General Morris was often gone and he also often attended. When he wasn't there, General Read attended or I attended. Now, that's a pretty sobering thing when you're a brand-new brigadier and you walk into a general policy council meeting and you're sitting next to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army because they sit by rank and he's the four star and is sitting in the middle of the table. General Morris was the ranking three-star in the Army and so that's where I would sit—in General Morris's seat. So, here's all these three-stars around the table and one or two brigadiers, one of them right next to the Vice Chief of Staff. Does keep you awake for the meeting! [Laughter]

But, you know, I was always wondering, were they looking down at me wondering where General Morris was? So, I think it is important for the Chief to pick his shots and make himself available for key times when the Army leadership wants to make weighty decisions and they're looking for collective advice. I know the last year before I retired, I had a couple of people on the Army Staff comment on how Hank Hatch was appreciated for his contributions, not just in subjects of Army engineering interest, but his contribution as part of

the collective leadership in bringing up issues or commenting on things on the wide variety of subjects that might be entertained. It's certainly a forum that one has to stand up and be counted if it's your issue or it's an issue you're interested in or might go against you. It's one where your ability at those crucial times might depend upon the credibility you have established during other times and your willingness to be a part of and contribute to the collective leadership there.

Q: Earlier, when you were talking about the organization and referred to the Environmental Office, we didn't really talk about specific issues during the period. I think from a couple of sources that I was looking at—for example, air and water pollution—did you have enough involvement with this to comment on some of these things?

A: Not really. It was an office—I think bureaucratically the Army was trying to figure out where it was on the environment. The Corps on the water resources, civil works side, was way out in front, with General Clarke having said, "Let's get involved with the National Environmental Policy Act and get out doing those kinds of things." From the standpoint of an Army program, this was an embryo stage. We had an office, we were writing regulations, but they were really early regulations from what you would find there now. We were trying to figure out how the Army Staff could communicate with all of its installations in the field, tell them what needs to be done, and what should our involvement be, and who should be doing that involvement, and that sort of thing.

Q: If I could go back to something I mentioned earlier, in 1979 did becoming a MACOM have much immediate impact—was it seen as fairly important? Was it seen as a possible way of helping with some of the ACE's military programs functional responsibilities at the time?

A: I always thought it was important—wherever I was when it came about, I thought it was an ideal move and would be important.

I don't recall any major strategies, I think, because the ACE's shop itself hadn't changed much in its operating entity. From the standpoint that we had an overworked major general and a colonel who operated then as his deputy but not having any executive director, we moved to have two general officers and we'd get more involved, but we didn't have the staffing to support us and had to pool our programming activity. We still were doing essentially the same things—that is, the Army Staff part of things—as before the MACOM. The MACOM was running the design and construction activities that had always been done by those folks across the river. The fact that they were in a MACOM cleaned up the lines from the standpoint of the Army. There were other aspects—it got the Chief of Engineers to go to commanders meetings, and now he was a commander at the four-star conference. So, it had those kinds of benefits, but in day-by-day operations it was not something that we spent a lot of time on.

General Wray may have over in his Military Construction shop, but in the Office of the ACE that was not a big ticket item. We were basically trying to sort out staff functions, whether it was Army Staff or USACE staff, and not worrying about the rest of the command structure.

Q: We had said your description when you were in the Pentagon earlier, that to an officer or a civilian, I guess, certainly on the Army Staff, life is a hectic one, with long, unpredictable days, middle-of-the-night sorts of meetings. I'm sure it's worse for a green suiter perhaps than for a civilian, but pretty frenetic.

A: Well, Al Carton always used to put in those same kind of hours.

Q: Same kind of hours?

A: Yes, and John Sheehey put in long, tough hours, and then others too, so it wasn't just green-suit types. You're right; you're driven by a process and decisions and that calendar that keeps grinding on. The PPBES system says the Office of the Secretary of Defense is going to do something on a date and the services have to answer if they want to count by that date. You get certain actions and you have so many hours—36 hours or 48 hours—to answer, and that's a window that has to be made to include all the coordination, getting every other Deputy Chief of Staff to sign up all the way up through the Vice Chief and Chief of Staff. I mean, a lot of wickets in there for 36 hours.

Q: When you were promoted, you still were in a colonel's slot, weren't you?

A: Yes.

Q: So, they didn't make that a brigadier general slot at the time—so you were sort of beginning to look for a job pretty early on while you were in the ACE's slot, I guess. Or were other people looking for a job for you, maybe?

A: General Morris told me early after my selection for brigadier general that he was going to leave me for the year, and I think he said that in the sense that I ought to complain if I wanted to. I really wanted to stay. I had come to the ACE knowing what was there and knew I was a natural because of the Europe job we've talked about before. I thought I had things to contribute, and it would have been a shame for everybody if I had left in midyear. I mean, that would have just been more turmoil for the organization. They wouldn't have been able to take the value of my contribution—what I brought to the organization from Europe.

I certainly learned an awful lot that year on how the Army system worked, the ins and outs of fighting the battles in the Pentagon and the programming and budgeting system. That helped me immeasurably later on when I was Engineer School commandant at Fort Belvoir. I mean, as the Deputy ACE I had participated and fought the battles on the mine program and UET [universal engineer tractor —later the M9 ACE] funding. From the ACE's perspective, I watched those working in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, and how they worked issues. I sat next to the Research and Development guy when he did his thing at the Program Budget Committee meetings. I didn't throw on the table issues on funding for mine programs or the UET; the Research and Development guy covered those. Those were his bailiwicks, not mine to mess with. I could always educate people, make sure they understood what was right or wrong about an engineer issue, or be able to receive intelligence that they were planning a cut in those kinds of programs so that

Major General Read or Lieutenant General Morris could talk to the commandant at Belvoir, or to the commanding general of TRADOC, or the Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development, and Acquisition.

So, I needed to stay for that year. Then General Morris in October or November called me and we talked about my future. He said at the end of that year he wanted to know what I'd like to do and we'd go from there. So, I told him I'd like to stay in the Washington area, and if they didn't have a brigadier position for the ACE, I'd like to be the Deputy Director of Civil Works.

Deputy Director of Civil Works

Q: So, that's what happened? October '80?

A: That's when I became the Deputy Director of Civil Works, right. That conversation took place the year before, or over the intervening months.

Q: Why did you want to be the Deputy Director of Civil Works as your next assignment?

A: Well, I wanted to stay in Washington. I'd just been there a year. I thought, having had a year of experience on the ACE part of the Army Staff, that if I could take a year in the Directorate of Civil Works prior to being a division commander, it would be beneficial. Not having been a district engineer, I thought that position would help me lean into division commander responsibilities. Understanding things from the headquarters, I'd be more capable when I went out to a division.

Q: So, the division command would inevitably happen regardless, probably, whether you—

A: Probably.

Q: Okay, that was actually in the fall, then, of 1980 that you went over to Civil Works.

A: My reporting date was delayed. General Norm Delbridge was coming in to be the ACE and I stayed on as the acting ACE for a short time. I don't know if it was a month or six weeks between General Read and General Delbridge, but there was some interim period because General Read had to get on to the Lower Mississippi Valley Division, and General Delbridge could not yet leave South Pacific Division. So, I stayed on as acting ACE.

Q: So, at the time you went over to Civil Works, General Heiberg was the director, is that right?

A: That's right. He had come back earlier from USAREUR, had been pulled back to be the Director of Civil Works in summer '79. He'd been the director for a year. We had talked, and so I was going back to be his deputy again. One day before I reported to Civil Works, the