

CHAPTER XIV

7th Infantry Division

Q: Could you tell me a little bit about your assignment as commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment?

A: Before the invasion of France, and only about six weeks before the invasion of France, I had been offered command of an infantry regiment in the 1st Infantry Division by General Huebner for the cross-channel operation, and I was very much disappointed in not being able to accept. That desire to command troops in combat also led me to my decision later to choose the assignment as Commanding General of the 1st Constabulary Brigade in Germany in 1948, instead of being Chief Engineer of the theater. All of my pointing was in this direction. I told you I had to transfer from Engineers to Armor, because I was going to be severely restricted in opportunities if I didn't. After the Korean War started, on one of my visits to Washington while the War College was still at Leavenworth, I volunteered for service in Korea. I went to G-1, who I think was then General McAuliffe -- I could be wrong about that, McAuliffe or Brooks -- and asked for the assignment. Well, I didn't get it then, but apparently my turn came up, and it was just 19 years ago, right now, that I got my orders. This became very clear in my mind when I thought of you driving down in the snow today, because I had the same situation with apparently more snow than we have today and almost missed my plane for the West. It's 19 years ago today. In any event, I also reminded you or told you that when I got over there I was somewhat disappointed in asking General Ridgway for an assignment in Korea as an Assistant Division Commander, that I didn't get it. I guess he felt that I should prove myself a little more, so I was sent up to the 1st Cavalry and, of course, three months after I got there I was made the Division Commander. After another nine months, or after just one year on Hokkaido with the 1st Cavalry, I went to Korea assigned to command the 7th Infantry Division. This was most welcome as far as I was concerned.

I would remind you of a couple of other things that made it especially meaningful to me. My first organization had been the 13th Engineers as a second lieutenant. This organization became an integral part of the 7th Division when it was activated by me in

1940 after having been dormant, of course, since World War I. Consequently, I'd had a year's service with the 7th Division before it left the United States, but in the meantime I'd been pulled out for many other things. It was very meaningful to me to know that I was going to get command of the 7th Division. I went by way of Tokyo and I dropped off my wife for her return to the United States. I reported directly in to General Taylor, who was then commanding the 8th Army and the United Nations Command. I was sent without much delay -- taken, I would say -- by then General Paul Adams, his Chief of Staff (who, of course, had been a member of the faculty at the War College with me), to the 7th Infantry Division.

I assume that it probably was the next day -- I'm not quite clear on that, but I think it was the 21st of March -- that I took over the division in a formal ceremony from Major General Wayne Smith. I don't recall where General Smith went at the time, but apparently his tour was up in Korea. Smith took me around; we took two choppers, two H-13s, and went around within the first day or two, and quickly called on all of the regimental commanders. Of course, there was a staff meeting and briefings at headquarters. I did quickly call on the regimental commanders and the battalion commanders, at least all of those in forward positions at the time. The division had gone into line sometime around the turn of the year, but because of winter conditions there had been no activity on the front until that time. The day I reported, however, it just seemed as though things were warming up and there was a considerable increase in artillery fire, according to Smith and his people. I hadn't been there, so I couldn't judge it relatively, but it looked as though something might be getting ready to happen. Well, the day after I took over it picked up even more and I got concerned with some of the positions. The winter had taken its toll on the condition of the forward positions. It may have been too severe for the men to work, but it seemed to me that more could have been done to strengthen those positions. I was particularly concerned about Old Baldy, which was then occupied by one company of the Colombian Battalion. Smith had gone by now and General Daniels was my Assistant Division Commander, an excellent Infantry officer. As the fires picked up, there seemed to be an indication that Old Baldy, one of the most exposed spots, might be the objective. I reinforced the position by putting the

Colombian Battalion, less one company, there. The position was not well wired in; it had only been occupied recently by the Columbian Battalion and there was a question in my mind then as to their ability, frankly, to hold this position under any severe attack. And the massing of fires indicated that that could be a prime objective of the Chinese. The Colombian Battalion was with the 31st Infantry, which had that sector, and Colonel Kern was then the Regimental Commander. The battalion attached to it. We didn't have to wait too long; the attack suddenly came within 72 hours of the time I took over command (the 23d) and almost before we knew it, Old Baldy had been overrun by the Chinese. Some of the men with that battalion we found coming back through the valley that led back from Old Baldy to Pork Chop. As a matter of fact, we found some of the officers there, too. They were turned around promptly and sent back to the front. This battalion fell apart, including its commander. And while we protected him, although he was replaced later, his performance in that particular episode or battle was far from anything desired.

His name was Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruiz Novoa. Ruiz was a fine man, but his battle experience was limited and the pressures were just too great. He came back with the feeling that his whole battalion was lost and had disintegrated. He was partially right. It had disintegrated, but it wasn't completely lost although the casualties were very heavy. (They sound like what I hear coming out of Hill 31 in Laos in the morning paper.) They had really concentrated tremendous strength against him. The question came up as to what to do about a counterattack, and the Corps Commander, General Paul Kendall, appeared and approved planning a counterattack.

General Bull Kendall was familiarly known by many. We did plan a counterattack. We took a reinforced battalion, picked out a site that approximated the conditions and the topography of Old Baldy, and trained for about three days. Then it was decided at a higher level that the position was not worth retaking. It had been lost a couple of times before; this wasn't the first time that it had happened. Also, it had been lost and then retaken by General Sam Williams, who was at this particular time in command of the 25th Division. Williams came up to provide assistance and give the benefit of his previous

experience in what to do with such a situation. The planning was good but it was never executed. The concentration of our artillery fire on Old Baldy was terrific, but as you know the Chinese burrow in like rats and while we could knock out anything on the surface, the minute the fires lifted they were right back in there. It may have been wise, under the circumstances, not to retake it. The negotiations at Panmunjon were dormant at the time; nothing was happening. The bad thing about losing Baldy was that it opened the entire rear of my position on Pork Chop Hill to complete observation, which gave me difficulties twice after that. From the standpoint of the solidity of my division position, I would certainly like to have gotten Old Baldy back.

Q: I understand that General Taylor did come down to you after you had practiced with the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry, which was the unit that you had chosen to make the counterattack. General Taylor, in consultation with you, decided that it would be best to abandon the terrain. This is what is recorded.

A: I'm sure that was the decision. My feeling about it was not sufficient to override General Kendall's and General Taylor's views, let me say; so that's that. It would have been a costly operation, and you had to be prepared not only to take it but to hold it, or else you were merely sacrificing men. The overall decision at the top side was that it wasn't really worth reclaiming. Everyone topside was hoping against hope that the war would soon be over. We'd had the statements of General Eisenhower widely published. You'll recall that he was the Republican nominee, and there seemed to be little doubt about his winning the election in the minds of most of us. I think the view at the top was that things would be easing off and probably an armistice would be forthcoming. I think it was somewhat the view that General Marshall had when he figured, with the war over in Europe, that we could quickly bring the war to a termination in Asia (knowing, as he did, the availability of the atomic bomb). It's one of those reasons why down at the lower echelons you can't be too sure of what the estimate of the situation is that brings about such conclusions.

Q: As long as you mention the atomic bomb, there had been written quite a bit about consideration that it would be used. Perhaps to jump way ahead, it had also been

stated that one of the reasons why it wasn't used, besides many political ramifications, was that we really didn't have a target for it, or we couldn't really get a target that was suitable. I'm asking you now, Sir, as a Division Commander again, . . . were you aware at the time, while commanding the division, that any consideration for the use of atomic weapons was being given?

A: We didn't have them except for strategic purposes. Sure, they could have used them at the Yalu River crossings and to the rear, but you must remember that we were very limited in what we could use for tactical purposes. I mentioned also that I observed the study that General Almond and Colonel McCaffrey made regarding where Almond used them when he had the 10th Corps and went into Wonsan and finally got thrown out of the same area. They never came to an acceptable conclusion that the bomb could have been used on a worthwhile target, considering time factors and a lot of other factors. Now, since then we've developed an artillery round and maybe other small tactical atomic weapons that could change that picture, but actually at that time we didn't really have the means.

In any event, my reception to the division was a warm one. It was made warmer by another factor that's making our operations more difficult in Vietnam. This was the beginning of the presence of newsmen at the front, at critical points, in places where to my mind they had no business being at that time. They had a young reporter from a prominent periodical, and he happened to be standing in an area while General Kendall and myself were having a discussion. As a result, he wrote a very derogatory article about me because he did not understand the situation or certainly did not understand the way a man like Kendall would talk to his division commanders, or even how I would speak back to him. These fellows are so soft that they don't understand the toughness of two men in relative command positions on a battlefield who lay it on the line and say what they think. He misinterpreted to the embarrassment, not only of myself for the moment, but also of General Kendall -- to the point where he (Kendall) felt it important to reply by a letter to the editor of that particular magazine. You've seen this thing grow now, and here we are in Vietnam paying for it every day with some of these people who are still wet behind the ears and others even who are knowledgable and fairly well

balanced but unable to absorb all that's really happening in the particular area in which they're involved. They are not experts in this field, but they pose to be.

Q: To add insult to injury, they are able to film and immediately show on TV statements of analysis which fit whatever description they want.

A: That's right. Then the public understands the situation even less. I must say -- and I do want to say particularly to you -- that this young journalist went on to other stations, largely in the Far East. I ran into him between five and ten years ago, but at least ten years after the incident. He was most apologetic about it and said that he had learned over the years that certain things did occur there that he was not able then to put in proper perspective. It was gratifying for him to come up and tell me that; I think there will be more of them, ten years from now, that might say the same thing about Vietnam.

Q: Sir, I don't want to move too fast through this area, because I think it's an extremely critical one. Since you did take over and had a rather warm reception, almost an initial baptism to fire as a commander of the division, do you feel that having commanded the 1st Cavalry Division the year before allowed you to free yourself of the minutia of the job so that you could, in fact, concentrate on the battle at hand?

A: Oh, yes, I think so. As I say, spring was coming, it was the latter part of March, the snow was disappearing, and the position was in what I considered very unsatisfactory shape. This may be perhaps because my Engineer background in field fortifications came to the front. I put on a tremendous program there. General Sam Marshall has written about it, and there's a lot on the record about cleaning up and strengthening these positions. Of course, it not only strengthened the positions, but it was good for command and for morale. I frequently inspected these positions, down to the lowest echelons, and that was one way I could tell whether my instructions were getting all the way through the chain of command. That was part of the satisfying experience.

Q: You mentioned when you first took over the division that you and General Smith helicoptered around. This was just about the beginning of the helicopter. How did the helicopter affect your ability to command and control?

A: It certainly was different than anything I had experienced with the 1st Constabulary Brigade, because although we had various types of light planes starting with L-5s, L-16s and 17s -- which are no longer heard of -- these still took a landing field or an airstrip. Fortunately, I had choppers when I was in the 1st Cavalry Division; not very many, but we had two or three. I learned of their great value for overhead observation, for getting the wounded out, and particularly for being able to exercise command and control by being able to promptly move to the scene of the action. I wonder sometimes how we did the job before. This has become all the more important, and it's one of the reasons why, when I moved up to the Chief of Research and Development, I was so anxious to see better helicopters developed. I don't think there could be a more interesting study than one that would discuss how many troops it would have taken to do what we have done in South Vietnam without the troop-carrying helicopters. You could have several committees working on one like that and come up with different answers. But they would all be in favor of helicopters. I don't know how you'd do without them as far as tactics is concerned.

Q: That would be a very interesting study. There's no question in my mind that the helicopter had a major role in troop carrying. I think that we may be beginning to question how far forward we should take the helicopter as a tactical weapon.

A: This is being questioned; there's no doubt about it. You get forward with the helicopter into a little higher intensity of warfare into anti-aircraft weapons of the quick-reacting type near the front, and you do wonder how close to the front you're going to operate. Of course, again with a broken front, or these islands that exist now more than the front (I prefer not to say "front" anymore; it's getting to be more like naval warfare at sea, where you hold islands or big pieces of ground.), the distances may be less because you're trying to defend in between them, or penetrate in between them if the enemy is holding them, and get around to their rear. We can see in

Laos what's happening right there now as the ability of the enemy to use SAM missiles increases.

Q: You know, General, you just mentioned the analogy to the naval situation. We've been discussing this at great length and no one has ever used the naval analogy, and I think it's beautiful.

A: I mentioned it 20 years ago. It's exactly what we're doing; change your scale, but this is what we're talking about in modern war.

After the loss of Baldy, I put heavier demands on my subordinate commanders and I followed through to see that they were being carried out. The morale in the division was low; I'll have to say that. It was very low. There'd been a certain abortive attack that had been made before I arrived, and I'm told it was almost deliberately for the benefit of newsmen to view from the rear. It hadn't gone well, and the result was that there was a feeling topside that this division was not a winner. I had to overcome that and try to build morale. I did so by a number of actions such as activating patrols. We did much more in the way of patrolling, penetrating the enemy positions. There were some losses, but we had to know where they were, for we hadn't known their positions too well. Not much had been done for months, since movement was difficult over the winter ground; let's assume that's the reason, anyhow. They had not closed with the enemy to the point where they always knew where they were. They were in front of this position or that position, so we pushed to contact. Where there was good performance, we stepped up the decorations and recognition for good performance by our men.

It was only three weeks later that the battle of Pork Chop Hill occurred. I knew it was going to occur, because the minute we lost Old Baldy they were looking down my rear. You couldn't get out to Pork Chop Hill without being completely exposed to what was on Old Baldy. That was important. We did win that fight. We knocked them off. This was the first battle of Pork Chop Hill, 18 April 1953. At that time both Pork Chop, which was then occupied by the 31st Infantry, and Arsenal Hill, occupied by the 32d Infantry, were hit. As I recall, Arsenal Hill did not cause much of a problem, but Pork Chop did require reinforcements. The Chinese were always trying to put on diversionary attacks, or at least place heavy artillery

concentration on other areas, like the Alligator Jaws and the T-Bone, which was really the back end of Arsenal. But at Arsenal, hell, I'd been out in those positions early in the morning, and there were areas where actually you were looking across at their positions at around 85 yards. It was very close, and at about the same relative elevation as our forward position at the spot.

Q: General, were you getting any ideas about the employment of our own artillery? We've talked about Baldy, which was March, and we talked about Pork Chop, which was April. You mentioned that the Chinese were quite good in getting holed in so that they were protected. They used to be able to walk themselves in with their own fire and our flash fires. Our barrage fires were really too late; they were already through them. Your emphasis on repairing the positions and reinforcing the bunkers permitted the tactic of calling for and bringing fire on top of you. Personnel could get themselves into a bunker and call for fire. I believe you're the one that started that.

A: Well, I won't claim that, but we certainly did. I couldn't have done it with the condition of the forward positions when we went in there. It was only after we really worked on the positions and reinforced them so that we could get our men under cover -- that they felt some security under cover -- that you could start doing this. Once we did this, particularly if we were using VT fuse, we reduced the probability of knocking out a bunker and things of this sort. We were getting the kind of distribution of those shards, you know, from the air that wasn't doing much to the stuff down below, but anything moving or living in the area was going to be knocked out. We did a tremendous amount of work in front of our positions by placing all sorts of land mines and wiring them in. We didn't have some of the devices that we have today. We had to improvise a hell of a lot, with gasoline cans, five gallon cans, and things of this sort; trip wires. The Claymore mine would have been very helpful but we just didn't have them.

Q: General, I have here a speech that you made to your incoming officers. It's a down-to-earth leadership talk, which essentially told them to get with their people; get to know them, work with them, don't put yourself above them, because this is much bigger than that. I know that when you were up at Carlisle you

started off with a talk similar to this. Do you have any comments on that, because it is a good, straightforward, down-to-earth speech.

A: No, but you're reminding me of something I haven't thought about in almost 20 years. When this division moved over in position from the Chunchon area, which is probably 60 or 75 miles generally to the east in Korea, they moved their forward echelon into the battle area but they left their rear echelon, the administrative and logistic support echelon, back in Chunchon. When I got there, all the recruits who were arriving and everything else, all the administration, was over there 75 miles away. The first thing I did was to bring my tail up behind me and I put in this replacement center where I could quickly get to it on a frequent basis. It made an awful lot of difference in our logistic and administrative operations. You just can't operate that way; you've got to close up, close ranks.

Q: General, before we talk about another battle . . . since we mentioned the Colombian Battalion, you also had the Ethiopian Battalion with you, frequently called the Kagnev Battalion.

A: It was a part of Haile Selassie's Imperial Bodyguard. Kagnev was a famous horse, the Emperor's horse, and they had four battalions in the Imperial Bodyguard; they were rotated to Korea on about a one-year basis. They were great soldiers. Most of them were mountain men; there were very few of them who came from the hot jungle areas. They were tough; that's why the Emperor picked them. They were lean, and they were mean, and they were tremendous fighters. They took no prisoners; as a matter of fact, that was one of my big problems, to get them to take prisoners. They lost no prisoners, either, to speak of; they even brought their dead back from the battlefield.

There was great carelessness in the maintenance of equipment. While I can accept all of the problems that evolve in and around the battlefield, from the dirt and the conditions under which men have to live, there is a necessity for men to keep their equipment in fighting shape if they're going to be able to use it when the time comes. This was particularly true of reserve ammunition boxes. Reserve ammunition boxes, as you know, are frequently stored in the front wall of trenches and in other places. They were dirty and

the ammunition was rusty; some of it would have jammed, I'm sure. We had a complete salvage operation that went on as part of putting the division back to work. This produced results in reclaiming and salvaging a lot of ammunition and getting it cleaned up. We also devised and mounted telescopic sites on our 50-caliber machine gun, which I had tried out before with the 1st Cavalry Division on Hokkaido; this added greatly to their effectiveness. The 50-caliber machine gun is not a gun to be used in more than short bursts anyway, and with a little practice and a good scope on it -- I've forgotten whether it was a four- or six- or eight-power scope -- we did some very effective work with these machine guns. With training and experience we got results from 1,200 to 1,400 yards and usually they were much closer than that to us, down to 100 yards. For the most part, you don't get direct fire from your artillery. It's not even easy getting a tank where you can have direct fire at enemy bunkers that are looking at you from 100 yards or so.

I think I mentioned to you the importance of awards and decorations, and I accented that. I was fortunate in having General Sam Marshall with me. Sam stayed about six weeks and added greatly to the system we had for prompt recognition of good performance. We'd go out, maybe at daybreak or whatnot, when a patrol would come in and get a firsthand report of action from the night before while it was still fresh in their minds. While it seemed a little brutal when they needed sleep, we didn't make it overly long. We found it extremely valuable to get the impressions that these men had right then and also to reward them very promptly as soon as we could make a determination. We didn't pass out awards unless they were deserved. It gave us information that we could promptly act on, probably the next day or at some formation after they bathed and rested up, or when I went to the hospital to see the wounded. I used to try to make a daily visit to the hospital in the afternoon when things were quiet.

Q: What was your authority as Division Commander as far as awards and decorations? Were you permitted to give the Silver Star?

A: Yes, I was. I could give up to the Silver Star. I found one situation where one person felt that every time he stuck his neck out he should get a Silver Star. I didn't go for that very much. Combat

commanders are supposed to take their risks right along with their men. You can't pin something on him just for doing his job, and that's what it can get to be if you don't watch it.

Q: Here's something that I ran across that I think is interesting (music score in green leather case for 7th Division).

A: Yes, it is. That was given to me by Horace Heidt, the great band leader. Horace and I were good friends; he came up to the division, as a matter of fact. He stayed some time and when things were quiet and the guns weren't shooting, I had a little orchestra for my Division Commander's mess. If we weren't out around the troops or his fine orchestra wasn't playing for them, Horace would join me and we had some real fine evenings then. After I came back to the United States, I got to know him even better over the years.

Q: I thought you might discuss your daily operation code; I'm sure that was yours.

A: Oh yes. That's mine, and those are my letters on it. I developed this in Germany. I've always felt that codes for quick action on the part of commanders, say within the division, have been inadequate. Some have been restricted because of Army security regulations. On the battlefield, there are times when it's more important to get a message through than to wonder if the enemy's going to be able to decode it and not send it. I had developed one method of doing it; there are several of them, but this is one workable method. I went for this when I was in Germany with the 1st Constabulary Brigade, and I always resorted to something approaching this system to really get through to my commanders. I'll admit I was a nuisance to them on communications, but there was nothing a commander could do that was much worse for him than to not be able to get in touch with me, and he soon found that out. And, by God, when they found that out and got working on it, they found it could be done, whether they got to relay it by plane, radio, jeep, or on foot. I always had relay stations at critical points, high points where, since the line of visibility was an important factor, there was a radio that could take it and either retransmit or relay the message to its destination. I used it in Germany effectively with the 1st Constabulary Brigade, on Hokkaido, and in Korea.

Harry Lemley was my Chief of Staff and he complemented me very well. You understand the terminology in which I'm saying that; he was more methodical and paid more attention to details than I did, particularly in orders and correspondence. He had an exceptionally fine mind and he had a pleasing personality. I never knew of Lemley antagonizing anybody. I may have occasionally, because I was more abrupt. Lemley was an extremely valuable man as Chief of Staff and I've not been surprised at his future success. I was particularly pleased when I saw that he was in command of the Staff College at Leavenworth a few years ago, because I know his competency and the breadth of the man; he's a splendid character as an individual.

Q: I must remark about the comments you just made that he was more detailed in his writing than you were. If there's anything I've discovered in going through your papers, you have an amazing ability to place on paper your thoughts in great detail.

A: Well, okay, but when I give orders or come up with a program or a decision, I'm likely to highlight it to the point where I think the people under me can develop it, and not take the additional time it needs to spell out all of the details. If that wasn't done sometimes, you might have to go around and pick up the pieces. With a man like Lemley, I could make myself sufficiently clear in the objectives I wanted and how I wanted them arrived at. He then came up with the plan. It's just like saying I want to move from A to B today, and somebody's got to say, "Well, what routes, what times, when does such and such cross a path, truck road, and all of that stuff," and that was Lemley's job; he could get the staff to execute it.

Q: Are you saying, Sir, that commanders or high staff officers or people working with them should let their people do their jobs, and the command give the order and the guidance?

A: Well, if the commander tries to do it all -- and nobody has that capacity -- he will fail. If Napoleon could have done it all, he wouldn't have established the principle of the general staff. Unless the commander does only the things that are essential, relieves his mind, reserves time to do other things, and sees that his orders are implemented and carried out in detail, then he's not going to get it done well. The one thing we fail to evaluate enough in this world is the relative capacity of the

individual. While anybody might do a job in a week, the guy that can do it in one day, and has got four days to do other things, is obviously a more valuable man. You can't do it if you waste your time on things that your subordinates should be doing for you.

Q: I think this is a lesson that we have to keep relearning for some reason or another. How about Ralph Cooper, who was your other brigadier general and the Artillery commander?

A: Well, I couldn't say enough good about Cooper, either. He's just a top-grade combat commander, a thoughtful man, knows his artillery, a real professional when it comes to putting his artillery together. Under Cooper's direction there we could frequently mass up to 11 battalions of artillery. I'm not going to put it in terms of minutes, but I mean right now, right fast.

Q: We talked about Artillery, and we talked about soldiers (doughboys), but we haven't talked much about Armor. I'd like your evaluation of the importance of the three combat elements of power that you were manipulating as the division commander. I know you were interested in the employment of armor before you even left for the Far East, while you were at the War College. Let's talk first about Armor.

A: Well, there's so many things that affect it; for instance you can break it out one way between the offensive and defensive. In Korea, we were definitely on the defensive; nobody ever let us move north of that line we were holding. We paid a heavy price for holding what we had at times, when they would concentrate as they did at the second battle of Pork Chop Hill. We ran up against a division of Chinese that apparently attacked in a column of battalions, about nine of them, over a period of four or five days. We were in a defensive position in mountains or rugged terrain -- narrow valleys -- and the valleys were largely wet rice paddies because it was spring, and we could not use our armor in a mobile manner. I felt sure that by June or July it would be sufficiently dry so I could use armor, and I had a company of armor which I thought was all I needed to go in and overrun a position that stuck out over on my right flank toward the Chorwon, around the right flank of the Alligator Jaws. My armor officers would go out after we were ready for the attack and they would sample the condition of the terrain. We sent patrols

out just to sample the condition of the terrain, just to see if Armor could get through. Otherwise, you get out there and you've got a battalion bogged down, and that's not good. Believe it or not, with the rain occurring every two or three days, with the dikes that were up to hold the water, we might have destroyed them, but it still is muck in these rice paddies; we never were able to launch a mobile attack with even one company of armor as long as we were in that area. Now, if you could break out of that, then that's something else about the use of armor. You can also use it to the point where all you do is destroy it, get it in a bottleneck on a road, as we see could happen right now in Laos and other places. The terrain governs to a large extent, so you first need reasonably favorable terrain, and you need to be preferably in an offensive situation. Now that's armor. Now what else could I do with it? Well, I was fortunate in having the main and only Chinese supply line on the left of my division come in at a fairly sharp angle to my flank, and there was about three miles of straight road on that line of sight. So we worked back on prolongation of that road and emplaced some of our armor in positions on higher hills that looked straight down that road and zeroed in. I used to send my L-5s out at night to reconnoiter, and they would fly up and down that road. They could always tell whether there were trucks there or not because they weren't getting any return fire. Frequently they would have the lights on every third or fifth truck coming down the road and the old L-5 would be coasting along and spot them. We'd bring fire on that road, and frequently we destroyed more vehicles than you've seen in some of those pictures of Mu Gia pass on the Ho Chi Minh trail. The best way to do it was from emplaced armor. Then, also, we were able to bring direct fire to bear on certain bunkers, but not always with a degree of accuracy you'd like to have.

As far as this night firing against a piece of straight road that was loaded with trucks, we would just alter the ranges slightly to cover that three miles; we knew the azimuth and elevation. By and large, it wasn't until the next morning that we could get a reading from our aircraft as to what damage we had created. Frequently we'd hit them and trucks would catch on fire but, by and large, we had to wait for daylight. We did do severe damage to traffic on that road.

Q: Would you say as a general assessment that the tank did not really play its primary role in Korea except for its fire power?

A: It certainly didn't play its primary role. It was not possible in a defensive position with that kind of terrain. They were very useful in fair numbers, but when I got there, the whole tank battalion was in reserve; not even the fire power was used.

Q: General, I wonder if you could comment on a statement by the head of the Selective Service System, Dr. Carr. Former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, he served in World War II and he made this comment about armor: "When you get armor, they're always so far ahead of everything that they really don't get involved." I don't think you'll accept that remark.

A: No, I won't accept it. I told you about the Germans in Russia, where the armor got out 100 miles in front of them and then had to wait for four or five days for the infantry to catch up with them by foot marching. That's the only way they had to move.

We should talk about the second battle of Pork Chop Hill -- which really was a prelude to the end of the war -- occurring in early July. After the first battle of Pork Chop Hill, the position was completely shattered and I had it rebuilt with heavy timbers. I used my KSC units. (Interviewer hands a schematic to the general of Pork Chop.) I'll be darned! How about that! That's it, all right.

Q: This is a schematic of Pork Chop, and I think it's the schematic that shows what you had rebuilt. I think this is as it looked around July.

A: No, no, I think this is what happened in the midst of it. I'm sorry, but whoever made this up didn't give us a date, because the attack came from this direction here. This is the part they overran, and I suspect this is what we were hanging onto when we finally withdrew.

Q: Just to make this clear on the record, I just want to state that I've laid this schematic out in front of you which does show the various defensive positions on Pork Chop. I'm also showing you a schematic photomap of the area which places Pork Chop in relationship to Chinese Baldy -- Hill 200 -- which was a very important part of the 6 July battle. And there are

other pictures in here that might help recall some points. This paper I'm showing you here actually is a report that was made after the battle to show the importance of the armored personnel carrier, the T-18, which I think we'll talk about. I would like to talk about the battle first.

A: No question about that. I'm sure that this shows the situation, and you notice that the hatched part here says "friendly control." Before the major counterattack was to be made, this indicated that part which we were still holding; the rest was Chinese controlled. I watched some of our counterattacks from a very short distance away. I remember this bunker right here. When they tried to break through I could see from Hill 200 in back of it. When the Chinese took Pork Chop they came up through here when they knocked us off. They came up here and the Chinese artillery fire was in back of their front-line waves; they literally were chasing them up the hill. I remember seeing one of our rounds of ammunition hit a chap who looked Mongolian. The man was one of the largest we'd seen, and I was looking at him through glasses from just a few hundred yards away here. A round of ammunition hit sufficiently near him to lift him, and he must have gone 75 feet in the air with his arms and his legs out; he fell with a hell of a big kerplunk over here. Some of our men saw him later, and said that he was about six-feet-four. We were counterattacking the area. We had flame-throwers and whatnot in the nose of this bunker here, for instance, and I'm sure some of the others like Number 7. At that time they launched their final counterattack and swept us off the hill again. Then the question was to really counterattack with sufficient force to clean them out and keep counterattacking, but since they kept putting in fresh units the decision topside was to abandon the position.

Q: I know it's been a long time ago, but you had mentioned previously that the Chinese were moving in a whole division with battalions in column. The information I have is that you committed 12 rifle companies to this attack; in other words, you committed almost your whole division in rotation to the attack. What did you think about your reserves? What was the situation on your reserves? Were you holding back something?

A: Yes, I had the Turkish Brigade available, and also one regiment of the 25th Division was earmarked for me.