

1.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL:

Subject: Landing Craft for Proposed Operations.

In accordance with instructions, the following comments on various JCS papers are submitted:

A. Adequacy of estimated requirements for landing craft for proposed operations:

1. Invasion of European Continent from United Kingdom in 1943-44 (Ref. JCS 291/1).

- a. Table VII considers maximum capacity of all available craft and arrives at figure of 226,000 men and 6,900 tanks. It is assumed that 6,900 tanks are mentioned for tonnage considerations only, as an armored force of that size would require a strength of more than 226,000 men in itself.
- b. A force of 225,000 men would include 20,000 vehicles (including artillery, bull dozers, etc.) requiring an added 100,000 tons of space. If some of these are substituted for tanks, the tank tonnage allowed (200,000 tons) would not be excessive as cubage rather than weight governs where vehicles are concerned, and the figures used for landing craft are not ship tons.
- c. A force this size for this operation would have to carry with it at least 5 days supply, an additional 75,000 tons.
- d. The utility of the 36' boat (LCVP) in a cross-channel operation is limited. If it is used, both this craft and the LCM must be loaded more lightly with personnel. In a report prepared just one year ago, representatives of all services (including British) seriously questioned the general use of 36' craft in this operation due to the impaired condition of troops upon landing. If they are to be used in the numbers shown, their combined troop capacity should be reduced from 131,652 to 100,000.



e. The text seems to indicate that an arbitrary reduction of 10% in numbers has been made, based on losses due to training, etc. No training has ever been conducted with 90% of craft kept in service. I believe another 10% reduction the absolute minimum to consider.

f. To summarize:

(1) Table VII provides:

200 LST	@	600	-	120,000 tons
300 LCI	@	75	-	22,500 tons
577 LCT	@	150	-	86,500 tons
750 LCM	@	30	-	22,500 tons
1157 LCVP	@	4†	-	<u>4,600 tons</u>

Total weight carrying capacity -	256,100 tons
Less 10% (sub-par.e)	<u>25,610 tons</u>
Net	230,000 tons

(2) Required for balanced force of 225,000 men with 5 days supply:

225,000 men	25,000 tons
5 days supply (all classes)	75,000 tons
6900 tanks (or 20,000 vehicles, arty. pieces, etc.)	<u>200,000 tons</u>
Gross requirement	300,000 tons
Add 10%	<u>30,000 tons</u>
Net	330,000 tons

(3) Comparison of (1) and (2) above indicates deficiency of 100,000 tons.

(4) Landing craft in Table VII will carry:

18 Assault Battalions	18,000 tons approx.
6 Infantry Divisions	120,000 tons approx.
2 Armored Divisions	50,000 tons approx.
40,000 Corps and Army troops	<u>40,000 tons approx.</u>
175,000 men w/equip. & supplies	228,000 tons approx.

(5) Everything else that floats will be necessary to augment the landing force.

2. Mediterranean Operations.

- a. The landing craft scheduled for the mounting of HUSKY should be sufficient for any other Mediterranean operation except for a combined Crete-Dodecanese operation. If HUSKY is over, say by September 15th, there will not be time, however, to mount another Mediterranean operation of any importance and still withdraw trained troops and equipment, including landing craft, to U.K. in time for ROUNDUP. A diversion on a small scale is possible, however. The withdrawal of 3 - 6 battle trained divisions from the Mediterranean for ROUNDUP is most important in my opinion.
- b. The Crete-Dodecanese operation will require augmentation of the landing craft available. This can only be done at the expense of Pacific areas and of ANAKIM and ROUNDUP.

3. Proposed ANAKIM Campaign. (Ref. JCS 297 and 303).

- a. Without regard to availability, it appears that the requirements stated in Appendix "A", JCS 297 are inadequate to meet the revised ANAKIM set forth in JCS 303. Even if full requirements listed under Appendix "A" II, JCS 297 are met, there will still only be sufficient to move slightly more than one division. The plan calls for four divisions plus six assault brigades. No information is available on use of AP's and AK's. Our Navy is providing 200 LCM's and 250 LCVP's immediately. Additional data is needed on the operational plan before recommendations can be made, however.
- b. Craft scheduled for ANAKIM can be used for no other operation before late 1944.

4. Pacific Areas.

Landing craft withheld from this area will vitally affect proposed plans. Despite failure to list LCM's and LCVP's in Table III (see note B, page 47, JCS 291), present plans contemplate increasing the number of these craft for shore-to-shore operations. The number of sea-going landing craft are likewise being increased unless diversion for BOLERO is ordered. We must retain the capability for some offensive action in the Pacific.

B. Production and distribution of landing craft.

1. Tab A presents a condensed picture of all landing craft production during the war and of distribution to theaters and to the British through 1943. This is considered as the deadline for production of craft to be used in ROUNDUP. I believe the figures given can be met substantially. Losses in major types should not be great, including HUSKY.
2. The following number of each major type craft are scheduled for assignment to theaters as indicated upon completion this year. They are included in totals shown in Tab A and are in excess to those already shipped.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Atlantic*</u>	<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Total</u>
LSD	4	6	10
LST	32	126	158
LCI	45	82	127
LCT	33	52	85
Tonnage	38525	98550	137075
%	30%	70%	100%

* Includes delivery to British.

3. The above data indicates that present Navy plans do not propose to distribute this equipment where the major operations are indicated. JCS 291/1 does recognize the need for such a shift, however. These figures were secured from the Navy Department and should be more correct than those in Table III, JCS 291/1.
 4. Where small craft are involved in numbers the possibility of assembly in the theater of operations may be indicated. Production in Australia is at the 200 per month figure now. Tests on shipping sectionalized LCM's have been made successfully. A saving in space of 50% for LCM's and 80% for LCVP's is indicated besides release of deck space for other purposes.
- C. The impressions gained by an initial study of the various JCS papers, leads to the following opinions:

1. The successful completion of HUSKY and the development of heavy air attacks on Italy is quite likely to force an internal upheaval. If so, some units may be needed to exploit it.
2. Any other Mediterranean effort against islands can only involve a diversion of limited value in the final conflict with Germany. Russia will not be deceived. Such an operation could not be mounted before November, would not help Russia much as the winter will be on, and would probably extend well into the spring of 1944 interfering with, if not preventing, ROUNDUP.
3. The British may desire this to maintain a sort of "floating reserve" in the Mediterranean to offset their fears of a thrust into the Near East.
4. The seizure of the Brest Peninsula would appear to be of far more importance than Sir Alan Brooke would indicate (page 8, CCS 83d meeting). Any beachhead "locks up" troops until they launch an offensive and break through, and this area would provide a fine base on the continent. The destruction of the submarine bases would play an important part in conserving shipping and supplies besides facilitating support for the offensive. Battle trained divisions from the Mediterranean might be mounted for an attack in that sea and actually be launched against, say St. Nazaire, with the elements for the channel crossing striking at about D + 3 days, or certain factors might reverse this timing. These same units might be staged in the U.K. except for disclosing our decision not to launch attack in the Mediterranean.
5. It would seem that ANAKIM could be mounted and that the situation in China demands action.
6. The possible absence of Russia from the war by 1944 deserves more consideration.
7. The development of combined air-amphibious plans and technique should be expedited. Air Corps tactical units from Africa and air-borne troops will be essential.
8. The thorough training of all elements is vital. Our present state of training does not justify the attempt of ROUNDUP unless a large proportion of battle trained troops can be obtained. Additional training in the assault of fortified positions and passage of obstacles should be initiated.

9. The training of Army and Navy crews and Army shore units must be expanded and accelerated. It may be necessary to review the projected use of Engineer Amphibian Brigades if ROUNDUP is firm.
10. Unless extended efforts are made by the British, our weight should be thrown to the Pacific. There is too much equipment becoming available to disperse it all over the world and fail to seek a decision on any front. The principle of mass still applies. We can't outwait the enemy; we must outfight him.

Arthur G. Trudeau

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU,
Colonel, General Staff Corps

2.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

AG 370.2 (19 Mar 45)E

A.P.O. 500,
19 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Engineer Special Brigades.

TO : The Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

1. In the succession of amphibious operations up the coast of New Guinea to Morotai, thence to the Philippines, the performance of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Engineer Special Brigades has been outstanding. The soundness of the decision in 1942 to form organizations of this type has been borne out in all action in which they have participated. These units have contributed much to the rapid and successful prosecution of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area. I recommend that careful consideration be given to the perpetuation and expansion of such units in the future Army set-up.

2. I pass on to you an item extracted from a report to me from Headquarters, Administrative Command, Seventh Amphibious Force, file Al6-3, Serial No. 0078, dated 15 February 1945, subject: "Report of the Lingayen Operation - San Fabian Attack Forces".

"It is believed that the Engineer Special Brigade as organized in the Southwest Pacific Area is the most efficient Shore Party organization now functioning in amphibious warfare and that the permanent organizations of these regiments have contributed in a large measure to the success of amphibious operation in this theater."

Douglas MacArthur

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
General of the Army, United States Army,
Commander-in-Chief.

3. Speech to Incoming Officers

7th Division, Korea

March-July 1953

Officers and newly arrived officers to the 7th Infantry Division: I am not going to take much of your time with the history of the Division because I am sure that will be discussed with you and presented to you by other parties. However, there are a few things that I think are important to touch on as you literally have arrived here to begin your Army career, at least in combat. I think it is quite likely that some of you have previously won your commissions through OCS or may have been in combat; I don't know. Are there officers here who have served in combat before? Fine. That's good. Well, you know what I am talking about. You can evaluate combat as far as passing information on to the other officers who may wonder about it. The first thing I want to stress to you is that when you've learned the various techniques of being an officer and doing an officer's job in the Army by going through various courses of instruction, that is only the foundation. The primary effort has to develop within you--your leadership capabilities must continually develop, and that will be true as long as you serve in the Army. The development of leadership is the essence of our job at all times.

Let's look into the question of leadership for just a moment. I could give you a talk on leadership. I'd like to if we had time, but I don't have that kind of time and neither do you. There are things to be done and work to do. But I want to point out to you that the two principal facets which make up the quality of your leadership are: first, your character; and second, your knowledge. Now I am not going to spend much time talking of your knowledge. You've taken various courses in schools and prior to that you were selected to go to those schools because it was evident that you had the basic brainpower and other good characteristics which would enable you to absorb the knowledge put before you. You have the knowledge if you have paid attention to the instruction given you; and you have the brainpower to acquire additional knowledge, so that is not the problem.

The principle in leadership problems here, as anywhere else, is in the development of the individual's character. Now we don't like to have anyone say that

there's anything wrong with our character. And I'm not making such a statement, although each of us being human has our weaknesses. But, I am saying that there is need for constant effort to improve our characters, and that's just as true at my age and for myself as it is for you as young men who are just starting out on your careers. Some of you may be in the Army all of your life. Many of you probably intend to go back to civilian life. At least I congratulate you on your determination to accept the responsibility and also the honor and the privilege of an officer's commission. Too many of our young men, who do have brains, are not willing because they don't understand the need to make some personal sacrifice for the good of their country. Now, this question of character--it's a matter of will-power primarily. It's a matter of doing the right thing at the right time.

The example that you set for your men will determine whether or not they follow you when the going is tough in the offensive. It will determine whether or not they stay with you when the going is tough and when you've got to hold what you've got. That is will-power; it's determination, it's guts, it's a lot of things. It isn't only a question of physical courage. All of us, to a certain extent, are creatures of fear, but by building day by day the determination within ourselves that when the time comes, when the going is hard, when it's tough, we are not going to be found wanting. We develop within ourselves those qualities of physical and mental courage which enable us to come through when the going is tough; and if there is one job that is more important than the other for the officer, that's it. You will have under you 20, 30, 40 or more young men. Green soldiers; youngsters. Your leadership will determine whether or not they will do the job, and in the tough and dirty job of combat it takes that kind of leadership. It takes that kind of leadership if the platoon sergeant under you and the squad leaders under him are going to react and do the right thing when the going is tough. They've got to have confidence in the "old man" even if you are only 21 or 22 years old, as some of you probably are. You're still the "old man" as far as your platoon is concerned, and the sooner you get in and prove it to them and win the confidence of your platoon sergeant and win the confidence of your squad leaders then you've got a team. Until then, they're wondering. They're wondering about you. So make up your mind that constantly, day by day, you are going to strengthen your ability to do your job and that you are going to strengthen your determination to do it no matter how tough the going is. It will pay you great dividends both in the Army and later if you

return to civilian life, whatever you intend your career to be.

The cost of doing your duty may be great at times. We all know that this is not ping pong we're playing here; but nevertheless, the individual must make up his mind that the service to his men, the service to his unit, the service to his country, is bigger than he is himself. He must go ahead and do the job with that feeling and that understanding. If you do that, you will not only be successful as an officer but you will gain great confidence in your ability to overcome any kind of obstacles and that confidence will pay you dividends wherever you go. It will be a matter of personal satisfaction that not even ribbons or decorations can equal, for they are only the tangible, the outward evidence, that you have accomplished something in battle. The inward feeling, that you have been man enough to do the job and that men under you respect you, they are the ones who know. The man under you knows more about you many times than the man over you does. Don't forget that. You can't fool the men that serve under you. They know. You can't fool them, and that confidence, that satisfaction that you have been their leader, that they recognize you as such will give you a satisfaction which nothing else in this world will equal, at least that's my feeling as a soldier of over 30 years service.

Now, without going into many of the details, I want to caution you about one thing in particular. There has been a tendency, unfortunately, by troops on the line to feel, "Well, we will only be here a week, so we'll sit on our butts and just leave the position as we find it"; and the result is that while there are trenches and various types of fortified works on our positions, they are not the strong positions they should be after a year and a half of occupation. They are pitifully weak in some respects, and when you go up there you will see that a great deal of diligent effort is going forth to improve those positions. Trenches have to be deepened. Shallow trenches are no good. Trenches have to be deepened where they will protect a man walking along from either being observed on the skyline or from incoming rounds. At least give them reasonable protection. Certain sections of your trench have to be decked over to give you protection when there is incoming enemy fire or when we put VT on our own positions as the enemy starts to close with it.

Your protective wire: You've got to have numerous bands of it. It's got to be far away from your front lines so that the enemy can't come up against your wire and start

lobbing grenades into your trenches. Your sleeping bunkers have to be away from the areas in which you fight. Something that you will have to watch all the time is the tendency of men in the first shock of battle, when fear hits them, to stay down in the bunker, taking their security in that place even when the enemy closes with your position. Most of the casualties that we take, not only of our own, but many, many of the enemy, we find are in bunkers. Men have sought refuge in bunkers when there has been close-in fighting; and the result is that the enemy tosses a grenade in the door, and that's the end of the people in that bunker. So when the fighting is close, there is only one place to fight and that's out in the trenches. It may be the tough way, but there is nobody's artillery fire on you at that time; it comes to hand-to-hand closure with the enemy. It is true that not many of the enemy are killed at the end of a bayonet, but it is in hand-to-hand fighting and it is the grenades and a lot of other things which are in close. Those of you that have been in combat know what I have been talking about. So be sure that you train your men to take cover when the artillery is coming in and to get out into the firing positions when the enemy are closing with you.

Another thing which is a great weakness, a tremendous weakness--in fact, I don't know anything that is giving me more concern--is the constant failure of your wire communications. I have great faith in radio; radio can be used very extensively. However, wire is most necessary in a fixed position, particularly; and the answer to it, gentlemen, is to get that wire buried. When you get up there you will be amazed at the maze of useless wire that is all over some of the positions and in the trenches in many cases. What we want to do is get the wire cleaned up and get it buried, and it should be placed along the bottom of your trenches. Perhaps, instead of actually burying it there, you sandbag it along the edge, but you protect it; you protect it so that practically nothing can get to it. This makes it easy to repair or to lay a new line, and the big thing is that you will have communication when you need it. We've hardly had an attack since I've been here where our wire hasn't gone out immediately. While I know the difficulty of keeping wire in, under heavy enemy fire, I will not admit that it is impossible; and I think that to date a very poor job has been done in this and in many other respects.

So, I give you those two points: Strengthen your positions while you are in them even if you should later move somewhere else into another area, another sector, a month from now. The other fellow is going to be doing

the same thing, and it isn't enough to let men sit back and say, "Well, we had to be up all night last night." Sure, they have to get sleep, I know that, but there are still certain periods of the day when you can get some constructive work done and improve your position because you either go forward or you go backwards in connection with your position; and we're going forward, so I want to get that point across right now. Strengthen your positions. Use what you've learned about organization of the ground. Perhaps you didn't get much instruction. There isn't much being given in the service schools right now, not as much as there should be in my opinion. Then, we will try to help you by additional measures which are being taken here to give you information in that regard. The second thing is get hold of your men. Control them. Earn their respect. Earn their affection if you can, but you don't do it by being too easy with them. Make them hew to the line. Make them do the things that you want them to do and make them do it exactly. If you can't get your work accomplished during the normal peace-time hours and if you can't get your orders carried out exactly the way you want them, what makes you think you can make them carry them out amidst the confusion of battle? The point is, they won't. They aren't.

So, treat your men with firmness. Treat your men with understanding. Treat your men with respect. Talk to them. Talk to them about things which are official and military, and talk to them about things that are personal. Learn the big things and the little things which interest the man. Have something in common with him, and you will create in him, with him, and particularly in your non-commissioned officers, respect and trust. They're the ones you should work through to establish a bond which will give you a team when the going is tough. They will come through, and you will know success as a leader.

I am very proud to have you in the 7th Infantry Division, and I hope that you find your service is stimulating. Much of it will depend on your own attitude. So go forth with guts, courage, and curiosity as to what makes this world go round, what you can do to run your platoon better, and what you can do to make yourself a better officer; and you will gain from that a satisfaction which will transcend anything else you have ever known. Thank you very much, and good luck to you.

This is a story about a dog and it developed like this.

The wife of the senior representative of a major U.S. newspaper was a key volunteer in assisting Mrs. Mark Clark in the direction of the USO in Tokyo during the Korean War. She also was the leading American proponent for a Japanese SPCA (Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). She may have had a good sense of humor but this story about her husband doesn't so indicate.

One day he attended a Japanese luncheon and after a "few" drinks and lunch returned home. (A "few" in Japan meant any single digit number but the effect varied whether it involved saki, beer, or Scotch, or any two of them - or all three). In any event my friend went home, slipped in to his bedroom from the garage and outside to the sun porch for a nap in the nude. While he was a well-balanced man, in this case he lost his balance fell off his cot and also off his porch.

Shaken, but uninjured he found himself locked out. Undaunted, he ran around the house and entered the front door. To his amazement, his wife was entertaining four tables at bridge. In record time, he flew through the dining room, knocking over a servant and disappeared in his bedroom.

There is no moral to this story but he later admitted under pressure that several of the ladies present exhibited a much more friendly approach later. Now, back to his wife, who reportedly kept him in the dog house for some time.

During 1953, I commanded the 7th (Bayonet) Infantry Division in combat in Korea. One of my soldiers, a private, when on R & R to Japan happened to meet the lady in question in the U.S.O. He was bitter that he couldn't have a dog in the forward areas and castigated me for it. We were in close contact and frequent combat with the Chinese as the battles of Pork Chop Hill, the T-Bone, the Alligator Jaws and others may remind you.

Nevertheless, the complaint, via the lady to Mrs. Clark to General Clark and thence to Gen. Max Taylor at Eighth Army, in Korea, thence to Gen. Bruce Clarke at I Corps and finally to me arrived for explanation. I replied as per the following doggerel and printed it in my division weekly paper. The demand was such that 20,000 extra copies were printed later to satisfy requests. Here it is. There was no further official correspondence that I recall.

Tokyo
June 12, 1953

Brigadier General Paul D Harkins
Chief of Staff
Headquarters Eighth US Army
APO 301

Dear General Harkins:

Thank you very much for your prompt reply to my letter enclosing an excerpt from a letter from the Headquarters of the 707 Ordnance Battalion of the 7th Infantry Division.

Am afraid though that it does not help the immediate situation cited in the letter. You do say that there is no directive prohibiting the owning of pets by enlisted men. In view of the fact wasn't this commander who had all the pets summarily taken away from the Battalion a little too drastic? Could not something be done to soften his attitude.

I realize this situation is a problem in Korea and I see all the sides of the question that you present but I was hoping that something could be done to facilitate the boys keeping their pets. Inoculations will immunize them and with a little care demanded of the men all potential menaces to the boys could be eliminated. These "pets" are a great morale booster as you know.

Animals can be taken home by anyone so desiring. The Navy Transports all Army personnel and will take pets provided they have been immunized and passed on by an Army Veterinarian.

Please give this your deep consideration. I am asking this as an animal lover and for the sake of the men who own pets in the Eighth Army.

Thank you again for your kind consideration of this problem. We are hoping not to have much more war so the situation can change and Korea no longer will be a combat zone.

Most sincerely,

/s/

/t/ - Mrs. , Vice President
Japan Society for the Prevention of C. to Animals
P.I.O. - G.H. C. F.E.C.

APO 500

C O P Y

22 June 1953

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau
Commanding General
7th US Infantry Division
APO 7

Dear Art,

I have now taken up correspondence with Mrs. about her dog, and the dog is the one in your 707th Ordnance Battalion. Can you give me any suggestions on how to answer her this time? What kind of orders did the Battalion Commander put out? Perhaps if we would look into the facts like so many other things, we will find that her friend may have read the problem incorrectly.

General Taylor chuckled to think that I had now taken over the correspondence, and being a dog lover himself doesn't want to ban all pets from the Army, yet he wants to be sure that the rules and regulations are sufficient to protect individuals who are around the dogs, and that the rules and regulations are carried out.

I have not answered Mrs. as yet. I will wait until I hear from you before I do. Sorry to bother you.

Best,

1 Incl
Ltr fr Mrs.
Parrott

PAUL D HARKINS
Brigadier General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 7

27 June 1953

Brigadier General Paul D. Harkins
Chief of Staff
Headquarters, EUSAK
APO 301

Dear Paul:

Prelude

There exists a single (but loud) complaint against some degree of control of the dog population in my sector. The exigencies of this "police action" in Korea have forced certain subordinate units to control the number and caliber of dogs inhabiting their areas. There is no order against dogs as such; in fact, there are hundreds in my sector.

Most soldiers have all they can do - and more - to care for themselves and their equipment. Few, if any, have time to devote to pets (and still do their work). As a result, most dogs are stray, and as such, impose a burden on units and become a nuisance in spite of our normal fondness for them.

In the summer season, dangers to health are very real. Registration and inoculations of this vagrant population is impossible under war conditions. Hence, while I am sympathetic toward dogs, I must permit my subordinate commanders, who know their local conditions intimately, to control indigenous dogs as well as indigenous personnel in their areas. The single complaint voiced out of a force of 25,000 men serving in the "Bayonet" Division area certainly permits no conclusion of unfairness to be drawn as regards existing policies.

OWED TO A DOG

I hasten to answer your latest letter
About the lad who lost his setter
Or was it a Korean malemute
With a collie's tail and a bulldog's snoot?
To tell you the truth, we have no orders
Against the possession of canine boarders;
Albeit the battlefield restricts
The way that dogs and soldiers mix.

The howls of woe from canine lovers
Have left my staff "twixt" smiles and tears.
This fight we're in is not just play
With all due respect to the SPCA;
So let's get on and win this war.
Then we'll cater to dogs, but not before;
When Chinese troops have left their trenches
We'll turn to legal sons of bitches.

We've brown ones now and black ones, too.
In fact they come in every hue;
They've got terrier's heads and airdale's rears
With corkscrew tails and amazing ears.
They follow the band and stand retreat,
In fact they are always under our feet.
But, like some soldiers I'm sure you've known
They seem to prefer the 2-point zone.

There's Kimchi and Sukoshi and No. 10,
And Hav-a-no, Tocsan and Pohung-dong.
They sit in the shade and sleep in the sun
For a dog's real work is always done.
And when your chow you start to eat
They stare until you toss your meat
To chase them away with their Kimchi smell
Which all of us here now know so well.

They've got fleas and mites
And other dog's bites;
They bay at the moon and bark at the sun
And yelp and snarl at everyone.
The way they wet like any pet
Is beyond all rhyme or reason;
The darn little pests pick the oddest nests
- and they're usually in season.

To whelp litters on a barrack's floor
Makes lots of other soldiers sore;
And our problems of field sanitation
Are worse when bones and defecation
Are left beneath your bunk or tree
Where in pensive moments you felt free
To contemplate on home or pals,
- Or dream of luscious pin-up gals.

To chase away a harmless pup
Whose tail curls down - but seldom up -
Is not exactly what kindly men prefer,
Except to keep some rabid cur,
Roaming an unsanitary area
Further upset by war's hysteria,
From spreading hemorrhagic fever
Would seem to justify stern measure.

To give them all an inoculation
Would require my vet to go on vacation
From checking the vegetables and meats
To chasing dogs out of company streets.
He'd never be able to retain his composure,
(I could round up thousands in the PW enclosure);
My Chinese prisoners have been rather serene
But most of these hounds are downright mean.

We're now dog-conscious "Bayonets"
And lest each GI doubts or frets
It's only fair that each should know
Most hotdogs come from Chicago;
That dog-tags bought by Uncle Sam
Are really made for use by man;
And only an SOB would invent
A contraption like a U.S. "Pup" tent.

I, too, love dogs and I own a cocker.
He's our pride and joy and his name is Topper;
We've some fine dogs here in the battle zone
And we give them food and a frequent bone;
But our complex tasks (less one forgets)
Require accent on battles and not on pets.
I can only say I'll do my best
And hope sleeping dogs will do the rest.

Sincerely,


Arthur G. Trudeau

5.

EDUCATION IN UNDEVELOPED AREAS

During three one-month inspection trips which have taken me to nearly all the countries of the Free World except South Africa and those in South America, I have noted that serious deficiencies exist with respect to education in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

This situation in a world of radio permits the user of the air waves to inflame popular feeling and thus influence its reaction in a manner out of all proportion to the soundness of his proposition in minds incapable of evaluating the fundamental truth or falsity of the thesis. The extended use of television in time will add to the danger. Motion pictures have contributed their share. Thus to utilize these great scientific and technical achievements for good instead of evil, there is a crying need to advance the mental level of man. In Libya, with a population of over 4,000,000, only 57 persons have had the advantage of a cultural education.

It is clear that scholarships to the U.S. for a relatively few selected individuals is inadequate, expensive and can be dangerous, if ideals and objectives are implanted which only become focal points for frustration as the years go on and youthful aspirations fail to be realized.

In none of the areas where the economy is largely an agricultural one does one find an integrated educational system. It is a long-range but worthy objective for us to explore. It can have a vital bearing on the world situation by the turn of the century if developed. If disregarded, it can only aggravate the untenable situation existing today.

I recall the Sheik of an Arabian tribe whose great desire was to send his son to the American University at Beirut. No money had been seen in his tribe for 10 months -- self-support or barter were the only means of livelihood. As he said, "I have many sheep and goats but I can't drive them a thousand miles to Beirut to pay for my son's education."

Last month in Southeast Asia I saw 500 young Chinese from Indonesia on a ship in Singapore harbor headed for Hong Kong and college in Red China. They were but a small part of an estimated 5,000 Chinese-Indonesians who are making that trek this year. Throughout the area, this is a pattern. Our loss of their brains is Red China's gain -- and they will be used against us later.

Without exploring further the related political, economic and psychological factors it appears to me that we must proceed along the following lines:

1. Expand the elementary school opportunities by training teachers, improving facilities, and developing a climate favorable to a solution of the problem.
2. Establish vocational and intermediate school facilities with teachers properly trained and oriented.
3. Encourage and support institutions of junior and undergraduate college level in selected countries.
4. Establish and support colleges and universities in selected areas for the training of outstanding individuals from neighboring countries. As a thrust I would suggest:
 - a. University of the Far East -- Philippines.
 - b. University of China -- Formosa
 - c. University of South Asia -- Pakistan
 - d. University of the Middle East -- Lebanon (American University of Beirut)
 - e. University of East Africa -- Ethiopia
 - f. University of West Africa -- Liberia
 - g. University of the Americas -- Colombia
5. Outstanding graduates of the above universities would be given graduate work in the U. S. as at present. Normal exchange of students would be continued.
6. English should be the basic language in area universities, but the faculty and guidance, while properly oriented should, for the most part, be indigenous to the area concerned.

For the cost of one month of battle in Korea, impetus could be given to the whole program. We ought to do more. We dare not do less, in my opinion.

March 1955

General

Although great advances have been made sociologically and, in many cases, from an economic standpoint in the countries of Latin America, the rapidly growing population, which is presently expanding at a greater rate than the ability of the area to even feed itself, constitutes a grave problem for the United States. Demographic studies indicate that by the turn of the century the population of Latin America will be in excess of five hundred million people or more than twice that of the United States. From a selfish, if an altruistic viewpoint, therefore, it behooves us to seek a solution to these problems before they are aggravated to a point beyond out control.

The health programs initiated during the last war have borne fruit to a point where infant mortality rates have been substantially reduced. Improved nutrition, although still inadequate, has likewise lowered the death rate and increased life expectancy. Birth rates continue at an all-time high. Unfortunately, the ability of most countries to make themselves even reasonably self-sufficient in food and food products, despite their potential to do so, is held back by graft and ineptness in high places and by the lethargy and indifference of the people.

The failure to initiate sound programs for the development of agriculture and grazing lands, including access thereto, for the exchange and distribution of produce and other items needed by the people is appalling. The people, on the other hand, despite their poverty and isolation, have been awakened by the motion picture, the radio and by demagoguery to seek and demand what they consider their fair share of the world's goods despite their inability to contribute much in the way of progress or effort.

While education has made reasonable advances, it is still limited and inadequate. Moreover, improvement in the general standard of education must be accompanied by comparable improvements in the general standard of living or else dissatisfaction and unrest will increase instead of being reduced.

The political structure of many of these countries leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, the concept that American democracy should be substituted for those forms of government now in effect must be approached with care. In countries where more than fifty percent of the people are illiterate and wide ethnic differences exist, as in Peru, it is not reasonable to demand our type of democracy or to expect that it could be effective even if adopted. I feel that the American press at times does us a great disservice by constantly criticizing the chiefs of South American states as being either Dictators or Communists. These are views that South American extremists have of each other but they should not be the views of the average American. In many countries our Ambassadors, as well as many other responsible officials, stated to me that the local form of government in the particular country appears acceptable to the majority of the people and that, while maximum progress may not have been made, they could envision other forms of governments which would have been far worse and few that would have done any better.

Since our main target in Latin America is, and should remain, the destruction of Soviet-dominated Communism or at least its reduction to impotency, I believe we should support the existing forms of government, barring positively the creation of extreme leftist or Communist states, which are presently a threat in several areas.

It seems to me our present military objectives should be to enable each country to have such minimum armed force as is necessary to provide internal security with a complete orientation toward the United States and with a standardization of arms, equipment, tactics, technique and doctrine to a point where additional effective military force can be generated in emergency.

The efforts of the Foreign Operations Administration and the United States Information Service are productive of great good and should be continued under constantly improving policies and procedures. The efforts of other governmental agencies are likewise assisting the area and generating ideas which we can hope will result in constructive programs of development and improvement. The training of elementary and secondary school teachers and the installation of additional vocational training facilities are of considerable importance. The program for the exchange between these countries and the United States is generating much good will and will have an even more important effect in the coming years. The training of Latin American military personnel in U.S. military schools is of the greatest importance and should be expanded. The concept of a University of the Americas, to be staffed by a faculty of outstanding educators from all countries and utilized on a large scale by carefully

selected students from all countries of the Western Hemisphere, deserves to be implemented in my opinion.

Arrangement for the investment of more U.S. capital under proper safeguards and with certain inducements such as tax reduction is badly needed. The competition from foreign markets, principally in Western Europe, is reaching a point where some easing of the trade terms imposed by an American business must be considered.

The need for roads of all classes and essential means of transportation and communication is of primary importance. It can well be said that South America has tried to leap from the donkey and the dugout to the airplane without much success. The construction of highways and access roads to potential agricultural areas requires maximum support. Some of this work could be done, however, by equipping army units within the particular country as engineer units to pioneer the development of new areas. In addition to the actual work accomplished, which would do much to raise the prestige of the army in the eyes of the people, these battalions would constitute an effective internal security force. It is difficult for me to justify MDAP anti-aircraft battalions in lieu of units that could provide constructive improvement for a country as well as a better type of essential internal security force. Under several country reports, this point is discussed in detail.

The situation whereby American business has controlled the Latin American market, to a great extent on its own terms, is disappearing due to the aggressive trade policies being instituted by Western European countries. It may be that they can better our offers as to price although American business has seldom been undersold. What is alarming is that through easy trade terms they are frequently taking the business away from American firms who have offered the product at a lower unit price. We can surely meet such competition with our resources. Perhaps we are subsidizing other governments to an extent that they can underbid us in one of our own primary markets. This is being felt not only in the commercial field but also in the purchase of military items. Venezuela, with her capability to pay for what she buys, is a good example of where we are losing in this latter field. I am sure that the New Orleans conference and studies by individuals far more capable in this field than myself will bring this problem into focus and indicate a solution.

Economics

Despite the facts that U.S. imports from Latin America dollar-wise have increased four and one-half times

since World War II and that our foreign trade with Latin America percentage-wise has increased from less than one-quarter to more than one-third during this period, the economic conditions in most of this vast area are still critical. With a larger population and more than twice our area, Latin America has only 6% as many miles of road, 5% of our power production, 3% as many automobiles and produces only 11% of our GNP. Too many of these nations are dependent on a one-crop or one-product economy which leaves them in a desperate position when adverse conditions in the world markets occur. One needs only to consider the importance of coffee in Brazil, sugar in Cuba, tin in Bolivia and copper in Chile to appreciate this condition. In certain countries fortunate enough to produce a diversity of items for export, any lowering in the demand or market price of a particular item can be absorbed with less financial difficulty. In those countries that are dependent on dollar exchange earned by export to pay for import of essential food items, the conditions caused by lack of markets become critical. This situation exists today in Chile where such great dependence rest on the export of copper. The economic repercussions of the drop in the coffee market are felt in many Latin American countries. The same condition ensues with respect to surplus tung oil in Paraguay and wool in Uruguay.

It is hoped that the interest being shown in Brazil as to the contract agreements arrived at in Venezuela with respect to United States investment and assistance in the development of petroleum resources will bear fruit. However, it is doubtful if much progress can be made prior to the election or change of government in Brazil. It is also to be hoped that favorable oil agreements can be reached with Mexico in the coming years.

The agricultural development of many countries in South America is a matter that deserves high priority. It is difficult to conceive that so many countries with primarily agricultural populations continue to be unable to increase their low degree of self-sufficiency in food and food products. Agricultural methods are archaic. Large landowners are relatively indifferent to modern methods of increasing production as long as they themselves gain a comfortable living. There is no distribution system worthy of the name. National programs for improved methods of farming and opening up and resettlement of new areas are largely non-existent although they are being stimulated by present U.S. and U.N. efforts.



HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20 March 1961

7. MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTORS, OFFICE AND DIVISION CHIEFS
OFFICE CHIEF OF RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Guerilla Warfare.

1. The expanded interest in Special Warfare activities, particularly guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla warfare, is causing this matter to be given a great deal of thought. It is important, in the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, that no effort be left unturned to provide the very latest and most effective equipment for such personnel. This applies particularly to the fields of fire power, communications, and items needed to live within the environments expected.

2. In stimulating thought toward that end I am having a review made in conjunction with the General Staff and Technical Services of what more can be done in this field. To assist in the thinking involved I am attaching comments from an individual who has given much thought to the field of guerrilla warfare. While this has no official standing as doctrine it is thought-provoking and is, therefore, furnished for your study and consideration.

1 Incl.
Some Comments on
Guerrilla Warfare

Arthur G. Trudeau
ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Lieutenant General, GS
Chief of Research and Development

Copies furnished:
CG, US Continental Army Command
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Comptroller of the Army
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Coordination Group, OCS
Heads of Technical Services
Technical Services' R&D Chiefs
Heads of OCRD Field Activities

SOME COMMENTS ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

I'm flattered that you asked my views on guerrilla warfare and training requirements. I have given a lot of thought to this, particularly as it relates to Communist tactics in the cold war and what we should be doing in this field. Of course my views are personal and probably would not stand the test of the cumbersome staffing and coordination process.

I do believe that accenting guerrilla training in regularly established combat units is not enough. Our regular units should receive training in antiguerrilla operations because this requirement may be laid on them at any time. The United States has not been faced with fighting against Communist-supported guerrillas to any great extent as yet. But the French, British, and other NATO powers have had some experience fighting guerrillas in underdeveloped areas. There are five general areas where we need to take further action.

1. Antiguerrilla training in its broadest aspects for our conventional forces;
2. Antiguerrilla training for friendly foreign armies in underdeveloped areas;
3. Developing a guerrilla warfare capability in friendly foreign armies, particularly where they border on countries with hostile governments with similar ethnic minorities;
4. Developing a guerrilla warfare capability under U.S. sponsorship from refugees from Communist-dominated countries, including not only those from the Communist bloc, but also from such areas as Cuba;
5. A regional school system in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Middle East Africa and also in the United States on Communist strategy and tactics, Free World political goals, guerrilla and antiguerrilla operations, propaganda, and subversion for both foreign and U.S. cadres.

Our special forces came about initially to provide training, equipment, and leadership to guerrilla forces in general war. This type of guerrilla warfare was to be primarily for supporting ground operations in general war. Much of our doctrine was patterned after the Soviet use of partisan forces against the Germans in World War II. Even as late as 1956 this was the extent of our doctrine in guerrilla warfare. There was little impetus to change this concept or at least to broaden it. Colonel Ed Lansdale (ASD/OSO) was interested in seeing special forces used to

advise foreign armies in underdeveloped areas how to fight Communist-supported guerrillas. Unfortunately, our doctrine is politically sterile and does not provide the answer to all the multiple facets of Communist cold war tactics in underdeveloped areas. The U.S. still maintains a wall of separation between politics and the military. This is fine for our domestic problems, but it does not work against Communist-supported guerrillas where political and military action are one.

The best example of a foreign army defeating Communist-supported guerrillas in their homeland was the Philippine experience in the early 50s. Colonel Lansdale (F) had witnessed this action. At first the Philippine Army was unable to isolate and defeat the Communist-supported HUKS. I believe the principal reason was that the army forces concentrated solely on trying to find and defeat the guerrillas themselves, ignoring the political climate in the Philippine villages. When the Philippine Army modified its doctrine and undertook civic actions programs designed to win over the villagers, the attitude of the people changed. The people then supported the government forces, accepted them as their protectors, and withdrew their support (even though sometimes this support was coerced) from the HUKS. With these changes the HUKS were defeated because the fish no longer had water in which to swim. The same tactics were applied late in Indo-China, but too late to save North Vietnam from Communist control under the Geneva Agreements.

Some officers in the French Army picked up these tactics in Indo-China and made further studies of overall Communist tactics. It had been quite puzzling for professional officers to witness the defeat of a well-equipped, well-trained, superior professional army by a few poorly-equipped, politically motivated guerrillas. I imagine Batista felt the same way observing a motley crew of Castro followers defeat 40,000 troops equipped with reasonably modern arms.

The French officers attempted to find a solution in a new doctrine for their conventional forces. Their magazine, "Revue Militaire D'Information," in 1957 had several articles reflecting some new thoughts in this field. They called this doctrine revolutionary warfare and psychological pacification. Application was begun in Algeria but was ceased after the French government considered certain French military elements to be using this doctrine against the French civil authorities in Algeria.

I wanted to cover these points to indicate that foreign armies have moved further in antiguerrilla warfare than we have. We have not had the combat experience in this field. Our experience with the Indians left much to be desired.

activities, and guerrilla warfare. The schools exist in the CIC School, Information School, Special Warfare School, Civil Affairs School, and the '59 National Strategy Seminar. Each could contribute something in the field of their primary interest in how to counter Communist tactics (including guerrilla warfare) in underdeveloped areas. From such a course we could train cadres for military units, develop doctrine, and finally train foreign military leaders from Latin America, Middle East Africa, and Asia.

To turn the guerrilla warfare coin over, we must find a way to overthrow a Communist regime in power short of general war and even short of limited war. I still see no reason why we should accept a tyrant government in Laos, the Belgian Congo, or any Latin American country. If they can afford a million dollars a year on propaganda alone in Latin America, and support a Communist government in our backyard, we can support free governments in Eastern Europe or any other area dominated by Communists. Again, this can be an indigenous operation supported by the tremendous psychological prestige of the backing of the United States in Eastern Europe. We can provide military assistance to an anti-Communist revolution. But here, too, we need a doctrine in the Army.

Presently we broadcast to the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as you know. When a revolt occurs such as in Hungary, we are unprepared to cope with it. We could train and equip some of the hundreds of thousands of the nationals who have escaped from Communist domination. I include here not only the Soviet bloc, but Communist Cuba also. Place these forces under U.S. leadership, organized on the basis of special forces. These detachments could have a capability of becoming a MAAG to a denied area where a resistance potential exists. Where U.S. policy supports such assistance, our whole foreign information activities can be stepped up. The assistance detachments under the Army's sponsorship can provide the basis for not only military assistance, but economical assistance to the resistance forces. There would undoubtedly be a political opposition to the Communist regime which our government might support. A government in exile or in belligerent status would provide the political base for the military or guerrilla warfare operation. I believe Communist armies are susceptible to subversion, however, we're not capitalizing on this vulnerability. The soldiers come from the people, and the people of Eastern Europe would fight along with the soldiers to overthrow the Communist regime if they knew we would assist them. The people of Eastern Europe respect the United States as much, or more, than any other peoples because we are their only hope for the future. The Hungarian Army joined the Freedom Fighters, not the Communist regime. We need no better lesson for all the doubters. The Soviets apparently do not fear that they will

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start general war when they assist Communist rebels in Laos. Why should we fear general war in providing assistance to Freedom Fighters in Eastern Europe? The people are on our side here. We could do this overtly. But in any event the Army could provide the tactics, doctrine and units to accomplish such an operation should policy ever provide for assistance to the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe.

I would visualize the doctrine as not much different from present doctrine for special forces. Infiltrate into resistance areas; develop a military base through recruiting, training and equipment and eventually expand the operation to military action if necessary to overthrow the regime. The differences between this doctrine and present doctrine would be these. The operation would not be in support of conventional U.S. military operations. Our military force would be the psychological club held cocked, prepared to prevent outside intervention. The guerrilla war would be political and anti-Communist, for national self-determination. The resistance area would be a base for total U.S. assistance (military, economic, political, psychological). Then let us compromise for a neutralist government in the Communist bloc as the Soviets so well like to do in western colonial areas.

Again, the Army could develop such a doctrine and such units as we have for the nuclear weapons. Where and when we use either is a matter of national policy decision. But the Army should have both weapons in the arsenal.

The Army could also participate in exploiting the vulnerability of the Communist armies as a threat to Communist political controls. Broadcasts for a short time each week could be prepared at Fort Bragg for dissemination over the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberation. The Army has the potential. We need more professional talent at Fort Bragg. I believe the largest paradox in the Communist system is their Army. They can't survive without one. But when one exists it is a power force and potential threat to the regime. Two examples stand out. Stalin brutally purged the majority of his senior commanders in 1936. The sore still lingers, I'm sure. The Soviet forces in Hungary fraternized with the Freedom Fighters in 1956. Outside forces, ignorant of the issues, had to be called in.

I certainly do believe we can do a great deal more in this field. I'm not sure the Army staff is ready to go as far as I think we should. The two names I would mention in the Pentagon who are most knowledgeable in this field are Colonel Ed Lansdale, OSO, and Slavko N. Bjelajac, Special Warfare.

8. Remarks at Final Retirement Review

Headquarters I Corps (Group)

Uijongbu, Korea

June 1962

Thank you, General Harris, distinguished members of the Korean Government and the Diplomatic Corps, Right Reverend and Very Reverend Monsignori, General Meloy, members of the Armed Forces, ladies and gentlemen, my Korean friends and fellow Americans.

It is almost exactly twelve years since communist forces to the north assaulted this country and after battle, tribulation, and tremendous sacrifice, they were repulsed by the American, Korean, and United Nations troops. Why we didn't march on to victory is not for a soldier to say. But after these many years the struggle still continues against world Communism.

Today some say that containment is a substitute for victory, but there are no cases in recorded history which prove this to be true. I know of no athletic sport that can be won as long as the other side has the ball. This is a time for all men who love freedom to stand side to side together. From Korea to Kuwait and from Berlin to Bangkok, too much blood has been shed by all of us to permit small issues to strain the bonds of freedom and unity. We must concentrate on the large objectives to be won and rise above human frailties if we are going to preserve the gains so dearly purchased ten years ago.

In addition to one million Korean people and thousands of Allied troops who shed their blood here, more than 140,000 Americans also shed their blood that Korean independence might be restored. This was four times as many casualties as we suffered in our own Revolution, but the cost of freedom is higher today.

In the several years and many times that I have been in Korea, it always seemed to me that the purple flowers that bloom on the north side of these beautiful hills in April and May were a bluer blue and a redder red because of our blood that had trickled down the hillsides.

You are different men than the fathers and brothers before you, but you are in the same units whose colors

you so proudly bear. We no longer hear the nighttime alerts that call for flash fires on "Pork Chop" or "Arsenal" or "Spoonbill" in our dreams. But if the call comes again, I am sure the spirit of old will rise again within you to meet the challenge in full measure. The law of life is one of struggle, and the cross man bears is a heavy one and probably was intended that way. It will never be made of foam rubber and our problems will not be solved on psychiatrists' couches or with tranquilizers.

It is a great pleasure for me to come back as a commander who has had the honor to command all of these units in time of peace and humble to command some of them in the full force of battle. No other tribute that could be paid me compares to this, and I thank you for the honor that you give me. That is why I came.

As I lay aside my uniform and the accoutrements of battle, I do so with pride in having shared command and comradeship with the finest cross-section of American men and gallant allies--men steeled in the crucible of war. Don't underestimate the importance of your role, evn when deterred by the daily and sometimes monotonous routine of duty. No enemy has ever struck where we have stood fast by our colors. Dynamic leadership, determination, and devotion to duty are the hallmarks of freedom, victory, and progress.

Today we stand here, Americans and Koreans, Thais and Turks, shoulder to shoulder. Let us never break the bonds that give us common cause in this fateful area of Asia, or to the south, or around the periphery of the free world. There is a victory for men and nations who dare and who stand with determination and courage behind bold, dynamic policies.

Faith and not fear; courage and not complacency; patriotism and not patronage; and sacrifice and not selfishness, are the guidelines to victory. We must be inspired to live but willing to die if necessary. As Horatio said at the bridge: "How can men die better than facing fearful odds; for the ashes of their fathers and the temples of their gods?" Without such courage to meet the future, we will deserve the slavery that will be ours.

We live in an era of great change that demands courage and boldness equal to that of the past but wth a somewhat different approach. While the armies of Genghis-Khan swept through these valleys 700 years ago with weapons that had been in use 1500 years before and for 500 years

thereafter--principally the horse with the lance and saber--now our weapons of 70 years ago are outmoded. Even some of our newer weapons that came on station seven years ago will soon be superseded by better ones.

But steel and fire are still inadequate for victory. Behind it all is good leadership and courage steeled in the hearts of men. These are the priceless ingredients. These are the determining factors in battle, assuming other factors are in reasonable balance.

Be proud of your country and be proud of your unit. This will be easy if you begin in the most important way--by being proud of yourself. Someday, when the sound of battle has passed and the roar of artillery has been stilled, when the crackle of small arms has faded, when the blood and courage of the battlefield is but a memory--and the brotherhood of man is more than just a dream--perhaps you say, as I do, "Thank God for having known such noble men." We need more like you. Goodbye.

9.

EXTRACT OF CLOSING REMARKS
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE 1950-1951 SCHOOL YEAR

BRIG. GEN. ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
DEPUTY COMMANDANT, ARMY WAR COLLEGE

And now, let me give you ten elements of strategy to consider in the light of the world panorama today.

1. With all due regard to the ideological aspects of, and moral values involved in the present world crisis, neither our government, nor our way of life, nor even our western civilization can be maintained without continued access to (1) the resources of the world and (2) the markets of the world.

2. The greatest threat today is Soviet-dominated Communism and its heart is in the Kremlin.

3. Since we cannot-

(1) Sustain so great a diversion of our resources and our wealth for security purposes indefinitely without seriously impairing our system and our strength; or
(2) Permit development of the tremendous manpower and resources behind the Iron Curtain indefinitely without a serious loss of resources and markets and further deterioration of the non-Communist world- a showdown before the turn of the century must be had. Every means and resource available to us must be used, including ready military strength if necessary.

4. In the present world, Russia is the acknowledged heart of the Communist octopus and all satellites, including China, are the tentacles. While slashing at the tentacles, the main thrust must be aimed at the heart.

5. Among our closest allies are the peoples of Western Europe. The most important industrial complex and power center in the world outside the USA is also in Western Europe. The life blood of European industry and trade, however is Middle East oil. For the long haul, whoever controls Middle East oil, controls Europe (Disregard temporary neutralization of Middle East oil or temporary supply to Europe from the Western Hemisphere). We must retain, or if temporarily lost regain, control of it. To this end the friendship of the Arab and Moslem worlds is most essential.

6. In view of the above, the security and defense of the Levant are vital and the situation pivots on the

Balkans, Southwest Asia and Egypt. The course of history for the next hundred years will be primarily affected by what we do or fail to do in this critical area.

7. The roll back of the Soviet can best be effected by securing Western Europe and the Mediterranean, rolling up the Balkans, continuing pressures at other points until victory is achieved and final detachment of the Ukraine and Caucasus as well as the nations of Eastern Europe.

8. The USSR must not be permitted to disintegrate, creating a vacuum, or the Yellow Peril will bring World War IV to the West.

9. China, denied direct access to any industrial complex, including Manchuria, can then be brought back to our sphere of influence.

10. World leadership by the U.S., established in a most enlightened way by resorting to the United Nations, NATO and Point 4 programs and not outmoded colonial methods, is essential to world stability and is the only alternative to world chaos.

10.

Arms Control: Noble Goal or Free World Suicide?

From a Speech Delivered at the Arms Control Symposium

Los Angeles, March 9, 1965

Since 1947 there has been a gradual movement toward arms control and disarmament. As early as 1945, the War Crimes Tribunals and "bring the boys home" hysteria signaled this movement. Or we could go back another 20 years to Litvinov's proposal to the League of Nations in 1927.

In recent years arms control has become a great national movement--or, more precisely, an international movement. The momentum of this movement has accelerated in the last two years. The impetus has come from both sides of the Iron Curtain, but for different reasons. Many respected advocates of arms control and disarmament in the United States believe that this is a road to real peace, while the Soviets use this as an effective instrument to further their goal of world domination.

A Contrast in Purposes

Indeed the United States and Soviet views of the purpose of disarmament are a study in contrast; the former being on the whole idealistic to an extreme, the latter being wholly self-serving.

The Soviet view on the purpose of disarmament is clearly shown by a very candid passage in Soviet Booklet No. 115 on disarmament written by B. Masyukedich which states: "In no way, therefore, can disarmament hinder the development of the national liberation struggle. Quite the contrary, it is precisely disarmament which will create these stable conditions of peace in which nothing will hinder its speediest triumph."

Quite obviously the Soviet definitions of the terms "stable" and "peace," as illustrated by this passage, are in stark contrast with the picture of conditions under general disarmament painted by most United States advocates.

Foundations and Government agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Department of State and The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, have opened their coffers to finance studies, publications, meetings and

seminars, costing millions of dollars. Press, propaganda and popular literary efforts have extended this movement by such novels and movies as "On the Beach," "Seven Days in May" and "Fail Safe." The public is being frightened to death by such language as "escalation," proliferation, megadeath, second strike and mutual deterrence.

The fundamental and worthy aims of Arms Control have widespread appeal. The desire to reduce the huge expenditures for armed forces and armaments is universal and understandable. Military men are no less concerned in doing this than are civilians, but must resist disarming if this is to be done at serious risk to our national security. Differences arise not in the ends, but in the means and the risks in terms of national security and the struggle to preserve the fundamental values of our civilization.

Effect on Our National Policy

Today Arms Control efforts are adversely affecting our national policy and military posture, from strategy to weapons. This influence is one of the most pervasive of all the forces at work today in restricting a more positive national policy worthy of the United States.

Many well-intentioned people believe that the risk of war can be reduced by making our forces "non-provocative." They conceive of such an establishment made up of forces which can survive a first strike and react slowly and deliberately. Hardened missile sites and overly restrictive control of tactical atomic weapons stem from this doctrine. They want to deny nuclears to other countries while curtailing our own capabilities, fearing that proliferation will increase the chances of war. Thus no Medium Range Ballistic Missiles have been built for NATO. Western Europe has been denied our assistance in developing a nuclear capability while it faces Soviet missiles, and Red China and even Indonesia forge ahead. Bombers are declared to be vulnerable weapons, only good for first strikes, and thus extremely provocative and destabilizing, so all production is ended. While a stable world environment is a worthwhile national objective, the basic and continuing ideological cleavage between the free and slave worlds makes this more ethereal than real unless human nature itself can be altered.

The very fact that recent United States disarmament proposals do not seem to require political solutions of major existing disputes as a prerequisite of disarmament demonstrates a very real danger that, in the United

States, disarmament, which is at best an idealistic approach to peace, may be becoming an end in itself. There is great peril in assuming that conditions of general and complete disarmament are synonymous with peace as we understand that term.

Secondly, the conditions of general and complete disarmament would make a pre-emptive attack more tempting. In the conflict between powers with major but demobilized war potential, any surprise move could be decisive. Therefore, the temptation of an enemy to strike first will be much stronger if the planned reduction of our stock pile from 30 to two thousand megatons is effected by the 1970s.

What Kind of Peace?

Lastly, disarmament favors those states which are better equipped to employ nonmilitary or submilitary and covert means of coercion. This gives a distinct advantage to the closed society over the open democratic society as years of cold war experience have proven.

Nor is the only danger in disarmament. We should also seriously consider whether such peace as might be established through disarmament would also protect and provide liberty and justice for other free peoples. The only peace that disarmament could provide today is peace that, even if free of overt military conflict, would force us to coexist with both continued injustice and covert revolution and struggle on every continent.

These premises may be anathema to many sincere devotees of disarmament--particularly unilateral disarmament--but the burden is theirs to dispel the serious concern most Americans have on this very delicate and difficult subject.

Let us begin with only three postulations. (We could add several more.)

1. Substantial disarmament can only take place with any acceptable degree of security in a world where Cold War or vicious covert political conflict as conducted by the Communist world has vastly diminished from what exists today. Short of this, a real "meeting of the minds" is impossible.

2. Treaties alone are inadequate guarantees as to future actions with the proven ingenuity of the human mind to

circumvent the written word or develop in secrecy weapons systems not yet conceived.

3. Bilateral agreement to "achieve parity" between the world's two most powerful nations, even if possible, would prevent timely and adequate defense by one against aggression fostered by the other in various parts of the world and completely disregards all third country problems, which are many indeed.

While many disturbing tremors and rumors have floated about for years over appeasement, accommodation, coexistence, interdependence, convergence, detente--and now controlled conflict and modernization with respect to our relations with the Communist or slave world, certain discussions and papers issued since 1960 increase the concern of many of us as to the base for disarmament negotiations and the true objectives being sought.

Influence of the Pugwash Conferences

The advocates of the World of Disarmament at the Sixth Pugwash Conference held in Moscow, Russia, three weeks after our 1960 presidential election stressed three objectives:

1. A highly centralized world government.
2. A socialist economic system.
3. A totally regimented society with a built-in, self-policing process using police and informers.

Are you skeptical? As a good citizen, you should be, particularly since this position was acceptable to a group of recognized American scientists, including some who came to occupy key policy-making positions in our national government.

Some of you may be inclined to scoff when I say that these Pugwash Conferences advocate a totally regimented society. But the late Dr. Leo Szilard--who with Cyrus Eaton and Bertrand Russell was one of the founders of the Pugwash movement--seriously proposed a worldwide Gestapo system at the eighth conference held in Vermont even more recently. Dr. Szilard emphasized the need for empowering a World Peace Court to "impose the death penalty" on anyone who even justifies war in defense of his ideals. Furthermore, he proposed that, "The Court could deputize any and all . . . citizens to execute the sentence." I'm sure you can readily see that this would only lead to disorder and chaos.

True, Dr. Szilard said that the system of worldwide control that would follow general and complete disarmament should be "aimed at securing peace with justice." But more significantly he added that "peace with justice might NOT be obtainable . . . and that we may have to choose between peace and justice. The system favors peace over justice, in cases where these two goals cannot be reconciled."

Lest you be inclined to shrug off the Pugwash Conferences are mere theorizing, I would like to point out that this movement has, to date, enjoyed unbelievable success. It may have paved the way for the Test Ban Treaty and for the United Nations resolution banning the orbiting of nuclear weapons--both seemingly desirable, but both loaded with possible fateful consequences for the future of our nation and of freedom in the world. What else have these Pugwash Conferences planted the seed for or accomplished? Have they signaled the weakening of American foreign policy supported by sufficient power to make it realistic--and credible?

Have they fostered other steps towards unilateral disarmament?

Did they initiate muzzling of the military and the continued downgrading of professional military opinion?

Did they press for reduction in the development and even procurement of new weapons systems and the cutback or elimination of some already under development?

Did they forecast the coming reduction of U.S. ground divisions to a number less than those available at the beginning of World War II? And air units to come? Or the psychological impact from the reduction of reserve forces that is likely to decrease the interest of our youth in preparing themselves to serve their country in emergency?

Did they result in the rejection of the manned bomber, Sky Bolt, Red Eye, Davy Crockett, the MRBM and other weapons systems advocated for new or continued military use?

Was such a philosophy extended in State Department Paper #7277 in September 1961? This paper proposed, you will remember, placing all armed forces and all weapons under one international organization--the United Nations. Our country could only possess weapons needed, literally, for internal police. This is the concept envisioned when

they talk about world order under world law. But who would enforce it?

Our Present Position on Peace

The proposal for general and complete disarmament, as presented by President Kennedy to the General Assembly of the UN and by our government to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, stands as the official U.S. position today as far as I know.

And how about the Phoenix papers prepared by the Institute of Defense Analysis at government expense to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1963? These studies call for parity of U.S. and Soviet military power. They advocate U.S.-Soviet unification in "near nuclear monopoly" to enforce peace. What impact does the Red Chinese nuclear--or perhaps thermonuclear--test blast have on this? If our Western European allies lack nuclear weapons when China possesses them, how can the Free World be protected and war deterred if we forfeit our present weapons superiority and accept a 1:1 ratio with the Soviet? This husband-and-wife row between Moscow and Peking is not one for us to get in the middle of. Their joint objectives to destroy us remain unchanged even though they differ as to strategy and the eventual control of the Indian sub-continent.

What "Study Fair" Recommends

If these examples aren't enough, let's get clarification on another government-funded study on disarmament entitled, "Study Fair, Volume 1." This study seeks to restrict the collection, evaluation and dissemination of accurate intelligence. It claims that there is "significant danger in information which is 'too informative.'" It states that "the loss of a third area does not always require positive action by the opponent." For instance, if Russia overran Western Europe, we need not necessarily contest it. Do you interpret our NATO commitments that way? Or even our interest in advancing a Free World?

It also advocates that we should "prevent shifts in allegiance of third areas whose prospective loss would cause the opponent to attack." For instance, we should renounce any hope for freedom from Soviet oppression for the Eastern European satellites because Russia might attack us. In short, should we abandon these people to slavery and Communism for all time?

Study Fair's recommendation of how our intelligence agencies must distort, delay or deny available information of the enemy, are astounding to me both as a former Chief of Army Intelligence and as a Combat Commander. Here are some of the actions suggested to assure the Soviets that we intend no overt hostile action under any circumstances. They say:

1. "It might be desirable to reassure the Soviets that no Polaris submarines are within firing range of the USSR; and yet we could not afford to pinpoint the location of all of them. One proposed solution is for the Soviets to be able to demand that a few submarines, of their choosing, surface and make their positions known.

2. "Automatic measures for delaying the transmission of information. Provide no data, for instance, on the current location of mobile missiles, as would a satellite equipped with television.

3. "Cessation of transmission during crises. If it did turn out that observation satellites equipped with television could provide substantial information on the location of mobile missiles, it might be desirable to be able to turn the cameras off by mutual consent, reactivating them only after the crises had passed."

How the Communists Must Be Laughing!

Soviet intelligence must be doubled up with laughter at such a concept. It is completely contrary to all human experience. To judge how far the United States may safely go in "depending upon the Soviets' word," one need only hark back two years to the Cuban missile crisis. You will recall that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko blandly lied to President Kennedy in assuring him that the USSR had no intention of installing missiles on Cuba when they were already there. If the policy recommendations set forth in Study Fair had been in effect in October 1962, the United States could have ignored verification or at least suppressed information of the missile installations. Since our Government still discounts frequently reported evidence of renewed missile activity on Cuba, this may be an indication that some of the recommendations of this study are already in effect.

Don't be deceived that these studies are merely think pieces. I've seen too many come to fruition to be fooled by this argument. They are trial balloons to establish trends and suggest policies in accord with their supposed logic.

We dare not, based on a record over these last two generations and evidenced every day throughout the world, rely merely on the Soviet word. There is a government within a government in Moscow. This is a basic point about the Communist structure that can only be ignored at dire peril. Promises or treaties made by the Soviet government are not binding on the Soviet Communist Party or the true control mechanism, the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Central Committee of the Communist Party can and does order actions through its extensive worldwide covert and overt agencies either unknown, contrary--or both--to the normal diplomatic or intelligence channels of the Soviet Government. What Kosygin says may well be the exact opposite of what Brezhnev intends to do.

The explosion of science and technology has opened doors never dreamed of a few years ago. In the nuclear field all of us, both friend and foe, are still infants. For one thing, we have no way of determining how much we don't know. More important to our security, we don't know how much our potential enemies do know, or how long it will be before--or even if--they know more than we know today.

A Nuclear Nudist Colony

I cannot accept the warped conclusion promulgated by some that since no modern defense can be completely adequate, we must accept the best disarmament terms we can negotiate. Had this criterion of absolute perfection been applied to our major weapons systems or space ventures over the past decade, we would have nothing today--not even early warning. In fact, practically nothing new has come into being in the last five years. With no defense against missiles or satellites worthy of the name, we stand forth today as the world's greatest nuclear nudist colony. Remember Russia, and perhaps even poor little Cuba, is looking down our throat today, with Red China in the background.

Recently, the Soviets displayed some new antimissile missiles. Even more recently, they demonstrated their ability to launch and land on land a manned and perhaps maneuverable satellite. If they are concentrating their current resources on the production of a weapons system by building supermegaton weapons deliverable from near-earth orbiting, maneuverable satellites, we are really facing the greatest threat that has evolved to date.

While the CIA is reported to have told Congress that the Soviets are pouring an enormous amount of resources into upgrading military weapons and hoping for a "qualitative breakthrough," defense plans still withhold a proposed \$25 billion expenditure over five years for missile and satellite defense that, by their own estimates, could save over 70 million American lives. Though I've gladly taken my battlefield risks for free, I hate to have any of us written off for about \$350 per person in these days of government largess.

Our apparent failure to press on toward even better weapons systems endangers our survival in the years ahead. I hope that within the bounds of such security as we possess, more progress is being made than is admitted publicly.

We must continue to develop and procure new weapons systems and equipment of the most advanced types conceivable. There appears to be a dangerous trend not only to reduce the research and development effort but to restrict the procurement of new equipment to even less than the annual amounts authorized and appropriated by the Congress. We may shortly be embarrassed by the appearance of enemy weapons systems superior to ours.

Strength Alone Guarantees Peace

To date, there is no alternative to the maintenance of superior military power to preserve our own freedom and repulse the thrust of Communism. Even assuming a positive foreign policy to accomplish these objectives and retain vitally needed access to the peoples, raw materials and markets of the world, it would be ineffective and worthless unless supported by enough power across the whole spectrum of possible conflict to at least make it credible and respected.

Again I must caution against those who equate the possession of power with the use of force. Possession of the former deters, and usually prevents, use of the latter when accompanied by the evident determination to use it, if necessary.

Of all the premises arms controllers should accept, I know of none more valid than this one:

The peace of the world, as far as overt conflict is concerned, has been maintained for nearly two decades primarily by the preponderant power of American arms and American industry.

Let us be sure of the soundness of any substitute before we destroy or degrade this power. We can "save," not two but up to 50 billion dollars a year on the National Budget by reducing our defense effort but if we do, we may be paying many times over in tribute and taxes to the Communist Treasury some day. If that sad day ever arrives, the Great Society will become the Ingrate Society overnight. We can neither cause the great international challenges of our time to evaporate or sweep them under the rug of domestic tranquility and complacency. Neither can we negotiate away any more of the free world without accepting a secondary power status and rejecting the basic principles that made us great.

Thus I am hopeful that, after establishing a more sound and safe base from which to proceed than is presently indicated, we may discover valid and acceptable guidelines for seeking arms control that may lead someday to the true peace for which most men and most nations yearn: cradled in the frame of a wiser civilization, lighted by the freedom and dignity of all men and roofed over by the kindly and protective hand of the Creator.



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9 February 1978

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Dear Editor

With Lincoln's birthday again upon us, it seems appropriate to tell this story about the best known and best-loved American in Asia and the Far East.

In 1952, when I commanded the 1st Cavalry Division on Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan, I made frequent trips by rail to visit the cities and many small, isolated villages on the island.

I would get into a town with some of my staff and be met by the mayor and the local police in an effort to establish good relations with the people on Hokkaido. There were usually very large crowds of children at the station when they heard that an American General was coming through. People who had been to some of the northern villages before told me how all the kids met trains. The first time I went I took two or three boxes of candy of one kind or another, chocolate bars, gum and whatnot, but by the time I stopped at two or three stations, I found I was getting pretty depleted, so I even had to break them up into pieces.


The next time I went I brought more but it still didn't suffice so I had to think of something else to do. Each trip I would then buy 10 dollars worth of pennies, so I started out with a bag with 1,000 pennies. I still ran out on some of these trips. This shows you how many kids would come to see the train. In talking with the Japanese I found what a great love and respect they had for Abraham Lincoln so I thought, "what can I do about this?" The commissary and Post Exchange complained about a shortage of pennies to make change with so I came up with the idea of a little card, plasticized so that it wouldn't fall apart too rapidly. I decided to put Lincoln's head on the front and the reverse side of the penny on the back and print something on it in Japanese. Of course, I realized that a lot of the smaller children could not yet read Japanese.

What I decided to do with the card was to make it large enough so that on one side I could print Lincoln's Gettysburg address and on the other side print a little anecdote about Lincoln that would have a special appeal to the Japanese people. Here it is.

Very few Americans, if any, are as well known to the Japanese people, including children, as our great American President of the nineteenth century, Abraham Lincoln. This simple man of the people with his deep devotion to his country and his dedication to democratic ideals recognizing the dignity of man, equality of opportunity, and freedom of speech and religion for all men, endeared himself to all the peoples of the free world. Doctor Henry Hansen, then President of Gettysburg College, where the decisive battle of the American Civil War was fought, and where Lincoln gave his great address to the people, told me when I was at the Army War College at nearby Carlisle that in 1938, at the request of our State Department, he hosted a prominent Japanese Statesman for lunch and a visit to the Gettysburg Battlefield. Asked what he most wanted to see, his guest said, "Only the place where Abraham Lincoln stood and gave his magnificent address." Taken to the spot the Japanese Statesman bowed his head in reverence and silence. Then turning to Dr. Hansen he said with great emotion, "if only the people of the world would understand Lincoln's message." His image is on our smallest coin, the penny, the one cent, but that is where he would want it, for all the people, even the poorest, to see and remember the ideals to which he consecrated his life.

Now with the penny in bronze on this card, which was about 4 by 6 inches, Lincoln's Gettysburg address on one side and this little anecdote about the Japanese Statesman which I felt would appeal to the people on the other, I had these cards printed and plasticized knowing that if the children didn't read them, and particularly if they couldn't read them, they'd take them back so their parents would read them. This was even more meaningful and what I had in mind. I had them printed by the thousands and it was not unusual to give away a thousand or 15 hundred while I was on a week's trip through northern Hokkaido.

All through Western Pacific from Australia north to Japan, the image and the memory of Abraham Lincoln still shine as a beacon to the disadvantaged and the down trodden of what American stands for.


Arthur G. Trudeau
Lt. Gen. U.S.A. (Rtd.)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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This simple man of the people with his deep devotion to his country and his dedication to the democratic ideals recognizing the dignity of man, equality of opportunity and freedom of speech and religion for all men, has endeared himself to all the peoples of the free world.

Dr. Hanson, President of Gettysburg College, where the decisive battle of the American Civil War was fought and where Lincoln gave his great address to the people, told me that in 1937 a prominent Japanese Statesman visited the Gettysburg battlefield. Asked what he wanted most to see, he said, "Only the place where Abraham Lincoln stood when he gave his magnificent address." Taken to the spot, the Japanese Statesman bowed his head in reverence and silence. Then, turning to Dr. Hanson, he said with great emotion, "If only the peoples of the world would understand Lincoln's message."

His image is on our smallest coin- a penny, one cent - but that is where he would want it for all the people - even the poorest - to see and remember the ideals to which he consecrated his life.

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Major General, United States Army
Commanding